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Hood: How Not to Decide A Case - And the Ramifications
of What Was Decided??
Karen Cordry*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989 and 1992, the Supreme Court decided two cases1 in which it
held that Congress had not acted with sufficient precision to abrogate/
waive an existing governmental immunity from avoidance actions.
After Congress clarified section 106 in 1994, the Court decided Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,2 in which it unequivocally stated that
no Article I power could provide authority to abrogate state immu-
nity, and agreed that its opinion would likely apply to cases arising
under the Bankruptcy Clause.3 Indeed, the first application of Semi-
nole was in a bankruptcy case where the Court granted certiorari, va-
cated the decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Seminole.4
Accordingly, there seemed little doubt that bankruptcy proceedings
were subject to the Eleventh Amendment and that immunity could
not be abrogated by Congress. By 2000, four circuit courts had explic-
itly held that Seminole applied in bankruptcy cases and that section
106(a) was unconstitutional. 5 That still left many arguments about the
extent to which the States could waive their immunity and whether
Congress could legislatively prescribe the scope of that waiver or
whether that extended "waiver" was really just a disguised abroga-
* The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be taken as those of the
National Association of Attorneys General, the Attorneys General, or their staff.
1. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't. of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989); U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U.S. 30 (1992).
2. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3. Id. "It has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright
statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a
State under any of those statutory schemes." Id. at 72 n.16.
4. See Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996).
5. Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000); Sacred
Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); Fer-
nandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. LLC, (In re Fernandez), 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997);
Schlossberg v. Maryland, (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140,
1145-46 (4th Cir .1997). Other circuits had not ruled on the issue, relying instead on a finding
that there had been a waiver of immunity in the particular matter.
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tion.6 Moreover, many provisions that were imposed as a matter of
substantive law (and not judicial order), such as the automatic stay
and the section 525 bar on governmental discrimination could be en-
forced by the doctrine described in Ex parte Young.7
Later, despite the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Seminole in Mitchell,8
the bankruptcy court asserted in In re Bliemeister that the prior deci-
sions in this area had missed the point and that, as to bankruptcy, the
question of whether States had retained their pre-Constitution sover-
eign immunity was still an open question. This conclusion was prima-
rily based on an analysis of the historical development of bankruptcy
as well as language in the Federalist Papers, that dealt with the re-
quirement that bankruptcy laws be "uniform." That decision spurred
a flurry of similar arguments around the country. None were upheld
on appeal to district courts, and the Seventh Circuit rejected it as well,
joining the other four circuits that had previously found Eleventh
Amendment immunity in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit BAP, though,
affirmed one such ruling as did the Sixth Circuit.
Tennessee sought certiorari of the Sixth Circuit's ruling on this his-
torical analysis, noting the conflict of its analysis with that of the other
five circuit courts that had explicitly addressed the issue. It was joined
by an amicus brief from virtually every other State, requesting that the
Court take the issue to decide the fundamental question of whether
the Eleventh Amendment applied to bankruptcy. There was no other
split in the Circuits - the propositions that the general discharge could
apply to States, despite the Eleventh Amendment, but that applica-
tion of that discharge to the specific facts in a complaint between the
debtor and a State was barred by the Eleventh Amendment - were
not disputed by any of the Circuits that had considered them. The
Court granted certiorari at Tennessee's request, and did not seek sup-
plemental briefs on any other issue.
During the argument, though, none of the discussion touched on
the Sixth Circuit's issues or analysis. Instead, the Court immediately
launched into a discussion about whether entry of the discharge was
an in rem proceeding that would not be a "suit against the State." It
held that its prior precedent and an analogy to admiralty cases dic-
tated the conclusion that the discharge was such a proceeding and, as
such, was not subject to the Eleventh Amendment at all. It held,
therefore, that it did not need to address the issue below, and that
argument still remains open.
6. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 683 (1999).
7. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
8. 251 B.R. 383, 386 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000), affd 296 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The discussion herein will look briefly at the Sixth Circuit's decision
and its analysis since courts will still need to confront that question in
the future. It will then turn to the Court's suggestion that describing
the discharge as an in rem proceeding is sufficient to resolve the issue.
A review of prior case law on the many types of in rem proceedings
and their interaction with the Eleventh Amendment suggests that the
Court's decision failed to take into account many relevant precedents
that could have greatly undercut its conclusions. The analysis below
will also review the decisions cited by the Court and will show that
they fail to provide strong support for the Court's conclusions. In an
area of such importance to the functioning of the bankruptcy system,
one would have expected an ironclad decision, but that does not ap-
pear to have been the result. A major part of the problem surely must
be placed squarely on the Court's shoulders for its failure to adhere to
normal jurisprudential principles that would have precluded a deci-
sion on issues that had not been raised, appealed, or fully briefed by
both sides. The failure to do so left an opinion that not only is flawed
but that provides little guidance to the future -a result that poorly
serves all parties.
Those jurisprudential principles include the constitutional bar on
federal courts providing advisory opinions, and the corollary that
courts should not decide issues that were not presented in a timely
fashion. On appeal, the same principle dictates that courts generally
do not hear issues that have not been raised below and specifically
identified in the appeal. The Supreme Court further refines those
principles in the use of its certiorari power, which allows it to decide
which issues it will take, and which issues it will defer to a later time.
The latter power - to allow issues to "percolate" in the lower courts
and achieve full definition - is the most salient characteristic of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. Conversely, even if a case is taken by the
Court, it may dismiss the writ as improvidently granted if the issues
turn out not to be well presented, or it can seek supplemental briefing
if wants to review new arguments that have emerged to ensure that
the relevant precedents have been identified, examined, and debated.
Those procedures are intended to ensure that the Court benefits from
finely-honed briefs and focused arguments.
Unfortunately, the decision in In re Hood9 violates virtually all of
those principles. The decision that was issued, and the asserted ratio-
nales for its result, are likely, if faithfully applied, to have many unex-
pected ramifications, not only as to sovereign immunity (in and out of
9. 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003).
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bankruptcy) but also as to bankruptcy issues that have no relationship
to immunity debates because of the Court's failure to note or take
into account its prior precedents. If there had been a fuller briefing
and argument, the Court might still have sought to reach the same
conclusion but it would have found it far harder to do so, and its opin-
ion would surely have been clearer and distinctly more limited. The
lack of preparation resulted in questioning that was not well focused,
and attempts to resolve factual issues resulted in questions that were
not clearly answered and to some extent, appear to have been an-
swered incorrectly. The cases cited in the opinion provide little sup-
port for the sweeping propositions they are offered for and, as a
result, the extent of the holding is notably opaque. And, in the end,
the Court did not even decide the issue on which it had taken certio-
rari, leaving that issue still open to bedevil the lower courts.
In any event, the analysis below will first discuss the decision and
analysis in the Sixth Circuit's opinion and then will review the lines of
precedent that the State could and would have raised had the Court
overturned the Sixth Circuit's decision and left these other issues to
the next day and the next case. While the review below barely skims
the surface - and there are certainly countervailing arguments to be
made - it will demonstrate that there is a plausible argument to be
made against the conclusions that the Court reached in this decision.
Recognizing however, that the Court is both final and infallible, 10 the
final portion of the paper will look forward and try to predict how the
decision should be interpreted and applied.
II. THE BLIEMEISTER ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court chose not to discuss this issue so this paper will
not discuss it at length.11 In the States' view, the Bliemeister argu-
ment, while not historically implausible, is, in the end, fundamentally
incompatible with the decisions interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment that began with Hans v. Louisiana,12 proceeded through Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,13 and culminated in Seminole. The
argument in Bliemeister and its progeny boils down, in the States'
10. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). "We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final." Id. at 540 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
11. For a detailed review and rebuttal of the historical evidence and the argument, see Tennes-
see's briefs in Hood, 319 F.3d 755; Karen Cordry, A Tale of Two Cites: Janc and Bliemeister, in
NORTON'S BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR No. 11 1 (2000); Karen Cordry, Seminole Seven Years
On, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 383, 393-414, 437-48 (2003) [hereinafter
Cordry, Seminole Seven].
12. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
13. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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view, to little more than the notion that "uniformity" requires federal
law to totally control (and displace) any state law on the subject. The
asserted corollary is that, if federal law controls a particular field, then
sovereign immunity cannot limit that control and states must be
deemed to have waived their immunity pro tanto with the powers
granted to the federal government. The argument primarily derives
from an opaque cross-reference in the Federalist Papers between es-
say 81, in which the State were reassured that their immunity from
judicial action would be retained, to essay 32, in which Hamilton dis-
cussed various issues regarding legislative supremacy and preemption.
The problem for those currently asserting this view is that it's sim-
ply not new. It was set forth, in great depth and with considerable
persuasive force, in a 55-page dissent by Justice Brennan in Atas-
cadero. While the decision in Bliemeister deals with a subset of the
Atascadero argument, 14 its logic is no different than the broader argu-
ment there, that essentially links the power to legislate with a corol-
lary power to set aside state immunity. The Seminole majority,
though, flatly rejected any such linkage, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred abrogation no matter how sweeping the federal
power that was being exercised.' 5 Even assuming that a requirement
that a federal law be "uniform" somehow implied that the grant of
power in that area was more plenary than the sweeping Commerce
Clause powers at issue in Seminole,16 the opinion is unequivocal in
rejecting any equivalence between the power to legislate and the
power to abrogate. After Atasacadero, the whole argument was
hashed out yet again in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,17 only seven years
before Seminole, so the Court could hardly have been unaware of
14. The Atascadero dissent would have found that to whatever extent federal law preempted
state law that it could also overcome state immunity. Bliemeister and its progeny limit them-
selves to one part of this argument; i.e., the instances where federal law is preemptive because it
entails a "uniform" law, but there is nothing in the deductions that they draw from the connec-
tion between Federalist Nos. 81 and 32 that would require that their analysis be so limited.
15. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72.
16. A requirement to pass uniform laws surely suggests a restriction on Congress, not a grant
of greater power. Most laws are uniform though, after all, without any special grant of "power"
to Congress to write such laws. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to protect Alaskan
salmon, but not Florida redfish, even though it sets uniform tax rates and prices stamps equally
in both states. Nor does a requirement that a federal law be uniform necessarily bar varying
state laws on the same subject. While a federal law can be both uniform and preemptive of state
laws on the same subject, it certainly need not be. The debate over whether federal law does or
should preempt varying state laws is a perennial staple of legislative debate, particularly in the
field of consumer protection. The answer turns on Congressional intent, not an automatic elimi-
nation of state laws in any field where Congress establishes a uniform rule (whether it be as floor
or ceiling to state efforts).
17. 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989).
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these points when it decided Seminole.18 And, since the entire argu-
ment, including the connection between Federalist Papers 81 and 32
had been before the Court in those cases (and was even mentioned by
the dissent in Seminole' 9) - it is difficult to see how this is a new argu-
ment as Bliemeister and Hood claimed. 20
It was perhaps for these reasons that the Bliemeister analysis did not
find marked favor outside the bankruptcy courts. The analysis was
actually dicta, since the decision eventually held that the state had
waived its immunity by failing to timely raise the issue. The ruling was
upheld solely on that basis by the district court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit.21 A few other bankruptcy courts adopted the analysis, but any
such decision that was appealed to a district court was reversed.22 Af-
ter the Sixth Circuit BAP's decision in In re Hood,23 the Seventh Cir-
cuit flatly rejected the analysis in Nelson, concluding that the Eleventh
18. In Union Gas, four Justices asserted that the States waived their immunity as to any Con-
gressional statute upon ratification of the Constitution. Id. "[T]o the extent that the States gave
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Con-
gress found it necessary ... to render them liable. The States ... are thus not "unconsenting";
they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution ... rather than on a case-by-case
basis." Id. As this waiver was inherent in the Constitution, there was no need for application of
a "plain statement rule" (the issue in Atascadero), a view with which Justice White disagreed.
(Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (plurality opin-
ion)), which appears to be why he refused to join the dissent in Atascadero. In Union Gas,
where the majority held the statute was sufficiently clear, Justice White agreed, in a single cryptic
sentence, that Congress could abrogate: "I agree with the conclusion ... that Congress has the
authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although
I do not agree with much of [Justice Brennan's] reasoning." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57.
Under this view, States retained immunity only so long as Congress chose to allow them to do
so. In practice, the difference between this dormant waiver, and the general waiver espoused by
the Brennan group is only with respect to the clear statement rule. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If Hans means only that federal-question suits ...
against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says so, it means
nothing at all."); and id. at 40 ("Article [III] Article would be transformed from a comprehensive
description of the permissible scope of federal judicial authority to a mere default disposition,
applicable unless and until Congress prescribes more expansive authority.").
19. 517 U.S. at 149
20. Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 388 ("Despite repeated acknowledgments of such exceptions to
sovereign immunity in the original Constitution, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity
to explore them."); Hood, 319 F.3d at 761-62 ("However, neither Seminole Tribe nor any of the
Supreme Court's other recent sovereign immunity cases address Congress's Bankruptcy Clause
powers as understood in the plan of the Convention.").
21. Bliemeister, 296 F.3d at 858.
22. See Alabama Dep't of Human Res. v. Lewis, 279 B.R. 308 (S.D. Ala. 2002), rev'g unpub.
order below; In re Serv. Merch. Co., 265 B.R. 917 (M.D. Tenn. 2001), rev'g 262 B.R. 738 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2001), rev'd, 333 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom, Comm'r of Revenue
of Massachusetts v. H.J. Wilson Co., 124 S.Ct. 2388 (2004); In re Nelson, 258 B.R. 374 (W.D.
Wis. 2001), rev'g unpub. order below, affd 301 F.3d 820; see also In re Roberts, No. 03-51856-
JDW, 2003 WL 22439869, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2003) (adopting Bliemeister).
23. 262 B.R. 412 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001) (upholding the bankruptcy court's use of Bliemeister).
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Amendment did apply and barred a debtor from initiating an injunc-
tive action against the state.24 With the circuits unanimous on the
point, the States, perhaps complacently, assumed that the Sixth Cir-
cuit was likely to take the same view.
III. THE HOOD DECISION
A. The General Context
That assumption, of course, turned out to be false when the Sixth
Circuit issued its decision in Hood. The problems started with the
opening pages where the court recounted the purported history of the
student loan exception and its impression of what it believed the state
was trying to do to the hapless debtor in the case. It noted that origi-
nally all student loan debts had been dischargeable, but in 1976, Con-
gress had begun to limit that right, assertedly at the request of
governmental lenders. At least for those loans, students could only
discharge them on a showing of undue hardship, or after they had
been in repayment for five (later seven, and later an unlimited num-
ber of) years. The court stated that this determination had to be made
through a "special adversary proceeding" (although it did not specify
why the student loan discharge was any more special than any other
complaint to determine the dischargeability of a specific debt). It then
asserted that Tennessee's motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding
was an attempt to bar the debtor from having the discharge decision
made at all, and that Tennessee was trying to "have its cake and eat it,
too. ' '25 Since courts rarely condone that form of legal gluttony, it was
predictable that the opinion would go downhill from there for the
State.
The opinion, though, misconstrued Tennessee's arguments. The
State did not contest the entry of the general discharge; it merely ar-
gued that an adversary proceeding brought by the debtor to decide
the status of a particular debt fell under the Eleventh Amendment.
That would not, however, preclude the debtor from asserting the issue
in response to a collection effort by the State. This split between the
general and specific discharge was well established by this time. Prior
to the Sixth Circuit's opinion, every circuit court opinion that had
passed on these issues agreed on three propositions. First, as a gen-
eral matter, the Eleventh Amendment applied in bankruptcy. Second,
based on some variation of an in rem argument, they had rejected the
intermittent attempts of some States to raise the applicability of the
24. 301 F.3d at 820.
25. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 759.
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Eleventh Amendment to the general discharge or the confirmation
process. 26 (The best the States had ever achieved was the statement in
Walker that the argument was not "specious."' 27) Third, this conclu-
sion about the global discharge did not preclude application of the
Eleventh Amendment to a debtor-filed complaint to determine
whether a particular debt was covered by any exception to the general
discharge. While, the generic issue could "bind the world," applica-
tion of that finding to specific facts (like application of a federal law to
specific actions by a state), was subject to the Amendment.2 8
The practical effect of these principles varied with the way the Code
treats the various exceptions. Under section 523(c), debts under sec-
tions 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) are discharged unless the creditor affirma-
tively initiates litigation in bankruptcy court. Accordingly, in the same
way that a forced filing of a proof of claim still waives the State's im-
munity with respect to litigation of that claim,29 so too the courts
treated the forced requirement to litigate these discharge exceptions
in bankruptcy court as a waiver of the State's immunity if it chose to
initiate the litigation. 30 As to the other exceptions, which did not re-
quire litigation in bankruptcy court, the State remained free to assert
its immunity so as to bar the federal court from litigating the issue if
the State objected. That immunity, however, did not eliminate the
Supremacy Clause effect of the general discharge (again assuming its
validity). Thus, a state court, confronted with a collection action
against a debtor, would be required to determine the merits of any
bankruptcy discharge defense offered by the debtor.31 There is noth-
ing odd or inherently problematic about leaving discharge complaints
to the state courts. Indeed, until the mid-1970s, all discharge litigation
was normally left to state courts and it was a rare situation where a
26. See, e.g., In re Ellett, 254 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2001); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Texas
Sys. v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 1998); Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust,
123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997).
27. Walker, 142 F.3d at 822.
28. See Walker, 142 F.3d 813 (distinguishing between the two proceedings).
29. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947) (clarifying that a waiver only
applies to litigation of the claim that was presented and the defenses inherently related thereto).
Since the claim was the only matter for which federal jurisdiction was invoked, it logically fol-
lows that the scope of the claim limits the scope of the waiver. See infra note 56.
30. Cf In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1998). If one accepts the supposition that the
general discharge can be entered at all, then there would be no logical bar to structuring it so
that the discharge exception can benefit to the state only if it chose to enter the federal courts
and request that right. Oddly, Platter did not involve one of the Section 523(c) exceptions, so it
is unclear why the State filed the action in bankruptcy court initially. Having done so, though, it
could not insist on only favorable results.
31. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1947) (stating Supremacy Clause requires state courts
to enforce federal law in their courts, regardless of their opinion of the merits of the law).
[Vol. 3:187
2005] HOOD: How NOT TO DECIDE A CASE
bankruptcy court would decide any of those issues.32 In reaction to
concerns that this did not provide adequate protection to debtors, the
Bankruptcy Act was amended (and the Code later written) so as to
give the bankruptcy courts more power to hear discharge complaints
in general, and to require their involvement in the most problematic
situations.33 Apart from section 523(c) exceptions, though, nothing
else precluded discharge issues from remaining, in most cases, merely
a defense to any potential post-discharge state court litigation. Thus,
dismissal of a complaint on immunity grounds would in no way bar
the debtor from raising an undue hardship defense in state court.
34
32. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934) ("What has now been said estab-
lishes the authority of the bankruptcy court to entertain the present proceeding, determine the
effect of the adjudication and order, and enjoin petitioner from its threatened interference there-
with. It does not follow, however, that the court was bound to exercise its authority. And it
probably would not and should not have done so except under unusual circumstances such as here
exist.") (emphasis added).
33. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1979) (stating 1970 amendments were meant to
prevent specific abuses and to "to give those claims to the bankruptcy court so that it could
develop expertise in handling them") (emphasis added).
34. In addition, raising immunity is consistent with regulations of the Department of Educa-
tion (DOE), which sets procedures for student loan programs, and contracts with State agencies
to serve as the administrators of the guarantee process. While the State agencies are the faces
that appear in bankruptcy court, the fact is that virtually the entire financial burden of defaulted
loans falls on the federal government, not the States, due to the federal reinsurance program.
Thus, the States essentially work in bankruptcy court to protect the federal fisc, not their own.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE HONORABLE JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S.
SENATE, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: FLEXIBLE AGREEMENTS wiTH GUARANTEE AGENCIES
WARRANT CAREFUL EVALUATION (January 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02254.pdf (noting structure of student loan programs); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2001) (lenders receive guaranty through state
agencies, but United States provides reinsurance to states for at least 98% of the value of loans).
DOE sets the terms under which State guaranty agencies must agree to guarantee loans, the
terms on which they must take back loans from the lenders, and the collection actions they must
take if they are to be protected by the reinsurance. Among the requirements are the duty to
review "undue hardship" issues in bankruptcy cases and evaluate whether they should be con-
tested or acquiesced in. If they are to be contested, the rules require the States to "oppose" the
discharge. Initially the regulations did not specify how the States should "oppose" the debtor
and the Tenth Circuit held that could only be read to mean that States must do so in bankruptcy
court, rather than by asserting immunity there, and later dealing with the discharge, if necessary,
in state court. See generally Innes v. Kansas State Univ. (In re Innes), 184 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th
Cir. 1999).
Thereafter, the Department of Education amended 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)(iv) in July 2000
to provide that "(iv) The guaranty agency must use diligence and may assert any defense consis-
tent with its status under applicable law to avoid discharge of the loan. Unless discharge would
be more effectively opposed by not taking the following actions, the agency must oppose the
debtor's discharge complaint." (emphasis added). 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)(iv) (2000). The ac-
companying commentary made clear that this was meant to allow States to assert immunity, and
that the courts had misread the original regulations by refusing to allow the States to assert
immunity. 64 Fed. Reg. 58,298 (Oct. 28, 1999). If there is a remaining conflict between the
federal policy to support discharges, and the federal policy for student loan debtors to pay what
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Moreover, even though they held that the State itself could not be
sued on a discharge issue, the bankruptcy courts had little difficulty in
finding that suits could be filed under the Ex parte Young doctrine
against state collection officials, if the debtor alleges that the debt was
discharged. If so, then the collection action would violate federal law
and the officer could be enjoined. Indeed, some courts concluded that
they need not even await active collection from the debtor but could
rely on the fact that the State has not unequivocally disavowed any
intent to collect the debt.35
Student loans have been distinguished, though, as an instance where
Young does not apply, because they require an additional litigation
after entry of the general discharge. Until the hardship determination
was made, the debt was presumptively not discharged, so most courts
agreed that there could be no violation in seeking to collect thereon.36
This did not mean debtors were barred from having the issue heard.
It merely meant that they could not affirmatively litigate the issue
when and where they chose. There may be practical disadvantages
with being limited to raising the issue as a defense, but that is not the
same as saying that the debtor would be denied a discharge entirely.
Perhaps the simplest way of dealing with the issue would be for the
Sixth Circuit to have joined a few courts that suggested that a hard-
ship issue could be raised in a Young complaint.37 One could argue
that the hardship existed as a Platonic "fact," whether it had been
determined yet or not, and that would be enough to allow the issue to
be alleged in a suit against the state officer. After all, factual and legal
issues must be decided as to the application of other discharge excep-
tions in which Young litigation is brought. For instance, was this tax
more than three years old (and how was the time to be calculated)?
Did the debtor engage in fraud? The parties would have to litigate
those issues before it could be determined whether the debt had, in
fact, been automatically discharged and whether, therefore, the collec-
tion activity was illegal. 38 Including student loan issues might have
been a step further, but not a major leap, by any means.
they owe, the best resolution might be changes at the federal level rather than suits against the
States.
35. See, e.g., Pace v. Kamin (In re Pace), No. 00-2279, 2000 WL 1056442, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jul.
28, 2000).
36. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 271 F.3d 629, 632-33 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jordon, 275 B.R. 755,
761 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); In re Stout, 231 B.R. 313, 314-15 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).
37. See, e.g., In re Kahl, 240 B.R. 523 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999); In re Schmitt, 220 B.R. 68
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998).
38. See In re Guiding Light Corp., 213 B.R. 489 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1997).
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The Sixth Circuit, though, explored none of these ramifications. In-
stead, it apparently began its analysis with two fixed conclusions - that
the State was seeking to attack the general discharge, and that, if it
were successful in asserting its immunity from having the discharge
complaint heard in federal court, that the debtor would lose any right
to relief. Neither belief was correct, but they undoubtedly played a
role in the course that the court chose to take.
B. The Historical Analysis According to the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit's decision is similar to that in Bliemeister, but had
a few quirks of its own, so it will be discussed briefly. It began with
the assertion that the uniformity aspect of the Bankruptcy Clause was
a "power" given to Congress. It then had a lengthy, if debatable, re-
view of what the Constitutional framers assertedly thought of the in-
teraction between state and federal bankruptcy laws. The opinion
suggests that the decision in Sturges v. Crowninshield39 changed an
established assumption that the Bankruptcy Clause would be inher-
ently preemptive of state laws, even where no federal law existed.
This was assertedly because of the "uniformity" requirement and an
assumption that "uniform" laws would be expected to displace the
right of any other laws to exist. 40 However, since by that time, there
had been a federal bankruptcy law for only a few of the thirty years
since 1789 (June 1801-Dec. 1803), and since States had continued to
apply their own bankruptcy laws throughout those decades, the asser-
tion seems problematic. In any event, in Sturges, the Court held that
the Bankruptcy Clause only barred state laws when actually exer-
cised.41 Absent a federal law, the only impediment to state laws
would be the Impairment of Contracts Clause. In Ogden v. Saun-
ders,42 the Court held that a state bankruptcy law could discharge cer-
tain categories of debts (debts owed to residents that came into
existence after the bill was passed, or that were not based on
contracts).
39. 17 U.S. 122, 196 (1819).
40. This describes the "field preemption" that is part of the so-called Dormant Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 571-572
(1997) ("Commerce Clause had not only granted Congress express authority to override . ..
conflicting commercial regulations adopted by the States, but ... also.., immediately effected a
curtailment of state power.") Thus, if Congress had not legislated, it was because it chose not to
have the field regulated, and states could not invade that province with their own regulations.
See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959).
41. Sturges, 17 U.S. at 122.
42. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
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Thus, even though bankruptcy laws must assertedly be "uniform,"
that constitutional requirement has a far less pervasive preemptive ef-
fect than the Commerce Clause, which contains no such explicit obli-
gation. Thus, at least by Sturges, it was clear that bankruptcy (unlike
the Naturalization Clause that really must use a national rule and that
was exercised immediately and consistently (and that was Hamilton's
actual example in Federalist No. 32)), did not require any similar pre-
emption of state law. Nor, of course, did Congress treat bankruptcy
legislation as having any urgency. In addition to the 1800 law (re-
pealed in 1803), the second law did not pass until 1841 and was re-
pealed in 1843, and the third was passed in 1867 and repealed in 1878.
It was not until 1898 that bankruptcy actually became a constant in the
U.S. Code.
The Sixth Circuit conceded that, even assuming States had ceded a
broad reach to federal power in the bankruptcy sphere, the question
remained of whether that had any bearing on an asserted waiver of
judicial sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit thought not, drawing
on the link between the two Federalist Papers discussed above. It
held that the reference to legislative preemption in Federalist No. 32
equated the right to legislate with the scope of the waiver of state
immunity, stating "There is no other explanation for his cross-refer-
ence in No. 81." 43 It cited no precedent for that conclusion, appar-
ently unaware that the debate about the relationship between
Federalist Nos. 81 and 32 had already been underway for almost
twenty years at that point. 4 It then looked at the ratification debates,
but brushed aside the statements of assurance to the State there, as-
serting that "Although the debaters' relative silence over sovereign im-
munity and the bankruptcy provision does not necessarily indicate
their acquiescence, it does undermine the notion that those ratifying
the constitution objected to federal jurisdiction over the states in such
cases."
45
Thus, the mere absence of discussion was taken to indicate acquies-
cence in withdrawal of immunity in a particular area. However, since
all of the discussions during the Constitutional Convention and the
ratification debates about immunity were relatively limited and did
not touch on specific federal questions issues, that reasoning would
43. Hood, 319 F.3d at 766 (emphasis added).
44. Had it inquired a little more deeply, it might also have looked at Federalist No. 82. In that
paper, Hamilton made explicitly clear that the discussion in Federalist 32 only dealt with legisla-
tive issues and that the rules might or might not be different for the judiciary. The statement is
made in passing and is hardly definitive either way, but makes clear that Hamilton was well
aware of the difference in analysis between legislative and judicial sovereignty issues.
45. Hood, 319 F.3d at 766 (emphasis added).
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support abrogation as to any Article I power, which is hardly consis-
tent with Seminole. Moreover, this reasoning seems to reverse the
presumption that was enunciated in Hans46 and reiterated by the
Court in Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth. 47 that
the States would not have waived their immunity with respect to any
proceedings that were "anomalous and unheard-of" at the time of the
Constitution. This surely places the burden of proof on the party
seeking to establish a waiver, not on the States to disprove one, but
the Sixth Circuit took a contrary view. In any event, at this point,
having concluded that States had agreed to allow Congress to abro-
gate their immunity in bankruptcy, the court need have said nothing
more - if Congress had the power, it had clearly exercised it by includ-
ing section 523 in section 106(a).
C. The Back-Up Analysis
The court did not stop there, however, but included an additional
paragraph with a number of statements that were factually debatable,
or nonsequiturs, or both.48 The assertions were similar to those used
by other courts to find that, despite the general rule that the Eleventh
Amendment applied in bankruptcy, that it did not bar entry of the
general discharge. But if Congress could abrogate immunity at will,
why include them, unless the court doubted its holding? It is unclear
if the court was actually trying to provide some final, albeit superficial,
alternative holding or if it was simply trying to find ways to diminish
the force and equity of the State's arguments. Whichever it was, it
seemed that aspects of that last paragraph were used by the Supreme
Court when it undertook its analysis.
The Sixth Circuit began by asserting that "This conclusion in no way
undermines the dignity of the state as a separate sovereign. This is not
an instance in which Congress has enabled private parties to 'haul'
states into court against their will.. .but an instance in which Congress
has granted states precisely the protection that they sought. ' 49 Since
Congress had allowed a private party to "haul" the State into federal
court through an adversary proceeding, the logic is hard to follow.
Citing Federal Maritime is even more problematic, since the Court
there extended the Eleventh Amendment to administrative proceed-
ings because, on a functional level, they looked and acted like normal
litigation and had the practical effect of coercing States to appear be-
46. 134 U.S. at 11.
47. 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002) [hereinafter Federal Maritime] (citing Hans, 134 U.S. at 18).
48. Hood, 319 F.3d at 767-68.
49. Id. (citing 535 U.S. 743).
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cause of the binding effect of a default judgment.50 If a practical "ef-
fect" of a non-judicial action can qualify as "hauling" the State in, it is
difficult to understand how a true judicial proceeding that advises a
State that a default can be entered against it, would not have exactly
that same effect. 51
The court might, however, have been saying that the State was es-
topped from asserting that it was being coerced to appear because the
scheme of hardship discharges via adversary complaints allegedly was
created at the request of the States. That argument bears little weight
for at least two reasons. First, the court cited no evidence that the
student loan provisions were put into the Code in 1976 and thereafter
at the request of the States, as opposed to say Congress' own initiative,
or the initiative of the DOE.5 2 Second, the same argument was made
to the Court in Seminole; i.e., that some States had sought passage of
the Indian gaming law that was being challenged, but nothing in the
decision suggested that the alleged involvement of those States in get-
ting the challenged legislation passed was of any significance, or could
result in the loss of the right of States to assert their immunity in re-
sponse to that law. 53
Next, the Sixth Circuit stated that "Unlike a traditional lawsuit, in
which a state is forced to defend itself against an accusation of wrong-
doing, the bankruptcy process is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of
interests claimed in a res.' '54 That sentence has several non sequiturs -
first, lawsuits don't necessarily involve "accusations of wrongdoing,"
as opposed to asserting competing claims of rights. And, even if one
grants that the process of dividing up interests in the estate that was
discussed in Gardner is an in rem action, what bearing does that have
on the discharge which has nothing to do with dividing up the bank-
ruptcy estate? Discharge exceptions have no relevance until it is de-
termined that a general discharge will be entered and they act only
upon property which is not being distributed in the case. Whether or
not one chooses to file a claim in the case and seek a distribution from
50. Hood, 319 F.3d at 763-64.
51. To be sure, in neither scenario do the U.S. Marshals arrive to haul an absent defendant
into court. The consequence in both scenarios is a default judgment.
52. The entire student loan system is based on federal regulations designed to protect federal
money. See supra note 35.
53. The closest that the Court came to discussing this issue was a statement in Seminole. Sem-
inole, 517 U.S. at 58-59 (rejecting the idea that Congress' abrogation of the States' immunity
could be made up for if Congress gave the States the right to participate in a process that they
might otherwise have been excluded from). See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 535 U.S.
734, *26-27 (1995) (discussing this issue during the argument).
54. Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574.
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the estate assets has no bearing on whether one may assert that the
debt is not discharged. 55
Gardner simply did not deal with the discharge issue; indeed, the
word never appears in the opinion. It dealt only with the defenses that
a debtor could interpose when the State filed a claim to estate assets
and concluded that such defenses did not trigger the Eleventh
Amendment because "The State is seeking something from the
debtor. No judgment is sought against the State. '56 Such defenses are
part of the adjudication of the interests in the estate, but have no rele-
vance to the entry of the general discharge, much less to a complaint
as to a particular debt. And, of course, denial of a general discharge
does not limit payment of claims from the estate, so it is apparent that
these two actions proceed on wholly separate bases.
The States do not dispute that, if they wish to be paid on their claim
from estate assets, they must allow the debtor to defend itself.57 Nor
55. Moreover, the vast majority of all bankruptcy cases are "no asset" cases with no res to
divide. To make the discharge issue derive from a division of a non-existent res lets the tail wag
the dog. It is probably for this reason that the Code (unlike the 1841 and 1867 Acts) does not
impose any further restrictions on creditors' actions based on their decision to file a claim. Such
a trade-off could be readily justified on a waiver theory - but would likely benefit precious few
individual debtors.
56. Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574.
57. In Gardner, the Court concluded that the State's concern was that the debtor was trying to
relitigate defenses that had already been resolved in state court. Id. at 578-84. Those defenses
might well be invalid and would be dismissed on their merits, but the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar them from being raised. The scope of the matters that may be raised in response to a suit
by a government is well-settled in non-bankruptcy cases, but still controversial within bank-
ruptcy. The standard analysis allows only true defenses - i.e., mandatory counterclaims that do
not exceed in amount or differ in kind from the government's suit - to be heard. This holding, as
stated in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509-10
(1991) is based on the fact that the filing of a federal action is not itself a waiver of immunity. see
also U.S. v. Murdock Mach. and Eng'ring Co. of Utah, 81 F.3d 922, 931 (10th Cir. 1996). Rather,
it is an invocation of federal jurisdiction that inherently includes the right of defense, but nothing
more. See U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1940) and U.S. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
309 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1940) (both holding that the filing of a claim by the government did not
allow affirmative judgments on counterclaims, absent an independent jurisdictional basis); U.S.
v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990); U.S. v. Neary (In re Armstrong), 206 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2000);
In re Dep't of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 956 F.2d 282, 285 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1992). The Seventh Circuit in In re Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd., 710 F.2d 1297, 1301 (1983) and
the Sixth Circuit in Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 443, 449 (1982) both
applied the same constitutional principles in dealing with immunity issues under the Bankruptcy
Act. See also In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., v. Australia, 293 F. 192, 193 (9th Cir.
1923) (under Constitutional standards, filing of bankruptcy claim did not allow for entry of af-
firmative judgment on counterclaim against foreign government). In cases under the Code,
though, despite the invalidation of Section 106(a), a number of courts no longer apply the stan-
dard analysis and conclude that Gardner stated a broad waiver as to counterclaims - even
though there were no counterclaims in that case! See, e.g., Arecibo Comty. Health Care, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2001).
202 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:187
do they quarrel with the holding in New York v. Irving Trust,58 that, if
they seek to be paid from the common fund, they must follow estab-
lished procedures for asserting the claim. Both points, though, are
essentially trivial and neither provides any support for determining
whether sovereign immunity affects the ability of the general dis-
charge to bar collection of the debt from non-estate assets, or the
power of a federal court to hear a discharge complaint against a state
for a specific debt.
In any event, the court concluded, "If [a State] prefers not to [par-
ticipate], it may decline, and the debtor will still need to convince the
bankruptcy court that repayment will constitute an "undue hard-
ship."' 59 That statement reflects little familiarity with actual bank-
ruptcy processes. Despite the requirement that discharge actions must
be brought by adversary proceeding, two circuit courts upheld con-
firmed Chapter 13 plans that discharged student loan debts without an
adversary proceeding and without any showing that the requested dis-
charge satisfied the Code, based on application of res judicata.60 Since
then, a number of courts have taken a harder line on plan provisions,
that should have been brought as adversary proceedings, concluding
that they violate due process and constitute "discharge by
declaration. "61
That line of cases, though, would only bar the debtor from ob-
taining default relief by way of a contested matter where the Rules
require an adversary. None suggested that a default in an adversary
proceeding against a properly served creditor would be equally inef-
fective. To the contrary, it almost surely would not be. An adversary
complaint is served under Rule 7004, which explicitly states that "fail-
ure to [appear and answer] will result in a judgment by default against
the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint." (emphasis
58. 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
60. See In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253, 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that plan paid 10%
of student loan debt and stating further that payments would be undue hardship; finding no
evidence of hardship but in absence of timely objection, provision was resjudicata); In re Pardee,
193 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding provision improperly discharged interest on student
loan but was valid if not timely objected to). These cases and many like them rely on the princi-
ples enunciated in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), which applied res judicata principles to
confirmation orders, even where they may violate the provisions of the Code, in the absence of a
timely objection.
61. See, e.g., In re Banks 299 F.3d 296, 301-03 (4th Cir. 2002) (voiding plan that contained
improper treatment of student loan on due process grounds where proper adversary complaint
not filed); In re Repp, 307 B.R. 144,147 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (finding due process voided plan
provision). But cf. In re Boyer, 305 B.R. 42, 49 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (finding plan provision
could discharge debt if language was clear).
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added). Nothing in current cases preclude entry of default judgments
on hardship issues - and, indeed, they probably happen every day.62
Thus, the notion that a debtor will have to affirmatively prove his or
her hardship if the lending agencies fail to appear seems unlikely.
Nevertheless, as we will see below, this optimistic notion resurfaced in
the Supreme Court's decision as well. Whether one can argue that
this, in fact, represents a reversal of Stoll awaits to be seen.
III. OF FIRST YEAR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND OTHER MAT=ERS
As set out above, the Sixth Circuit barely mentioned any concepts
relating to in rem jurisdiction and certainly did not rest its opinion on
those issues. Nevertheless, when the argument began in the Supreme
Court, Tennessee's counsel was not even able to complete his first sen-
tence before Justice O'Connor wanted to know why this case wasn't
akin to the in rem jurisdiction in admiralty cases in California v. Deep
Sea Research.63 The most accurate answer probably would have been
- "because, as your Honor herself made clear at page 506-08 in Deep
Sea, the opinion was only applicable to a limited subset of admiralty
proceedings and you explicitly stated that the situation was different
for the equivalent sort of action in proceedings in law and equity. So,
if you told us Deep Sea isn't relevant, why are you bringing it up
now?" Not a tactful - or wise - answer, to be sure, but accurate.
Counsel did try to draw the distinction (in a more tactful way), but
Justice O'Connor could not be dissuaded and the Court settled in for
an extended discussion on in rem issues. Unfortunately, since, those
issues had not been decided, appealed, or fully briefed, the State's
counsel was far from being in the best position to discuss them. The
rest of this section deals with what the State might have been able to
present if the Court had requested briefing and argument on the issue:
"Does the Eleventh Amendment apply to in rem proceedings in mat-
ters arising in law or equity?" An alternative (and more evocative, or
provocative, phrasing) might have been "Does the fact that Congress
designates a proceeding in law or equity as being in rem, when that
proceeding is otherwise substantively identical to an in personam pro-
ceeding, 64 allow a private party to sue in federal court and obtain an
62. See, e.g., In re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Grant, 305 B.R. 484 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 2004) (finding no undue hardship for debtor to pay remaining debts when when non-ap-
pearing party defaulted); In re Haag, 274 B.R. 833 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002) (dismissing the state
on sovereign immunity grounds and entering default judgment against Sallie Mae on undue
hardship issue).
63. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
64: Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 1913-14 (2004)
("Our precedent has drawn a distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction, even
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order that binds an unconsenting State, despite the Eleventh Amend-
ment?" Had those questions been briefed and argued, it is fair to as-
sume that the opinion that issued would have been a far more
complex, nuanced, and difficult one than the one being reviewed now.
A. A Word Means Just What I Say65
The first difficulty in that one must remember that the terms "in
rem jurisdiction" and "adjudication of interests in a res" are neither
synonymous nor well defined. We assume we recall what the defini-
tions are from our first year Civil Procedure but as it turns out, a great
evolution in jurisdiction and due process law took place in the 1970s
and thereafter and many of the concepts and fictions that had been
used in the past were changed drastically. Yet, there is little recogni-
tion of that in current opinions on these topics, or a sense that one
must be mindful that those changes may cast doubts on the validity of
language quoted in old cases, particularly when cited without a factual
context.
The cases may also use bankruptcy terms that had very different
meanings under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841 or 1867, or even
1898 then they do now, but the distinctions may not always be appar-
ent. Assuming that one knows what they mean because they look like
the same words we use now, can unwittingly lead one far astray. The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission suggested that new terms
should be devised for "rejecting" and "assuming" a contract, since the
existing terms suggested far more radical effects on the terms of a
contract than the relatively modest provisions of section 365 actually
provide. The same is true with a vengeance in the case of the word
"discharge."
when the underlying proceedings are, for the most part, identical."). The statement is correct to
the extent that it notes there is nothing inherently different about the proceedings that may
proceed in rem, versus in personam. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92. To the extent that
it impliedly suggests that the distinction involves an inherent right to ignore the Eleventh
Amendment in in rem proceedings, the discussion below will suggest that is not consistent with
Supreme Court decisions in numerous areas of the law and would work a sea change in the
understanding of sovereign immunity if it were.
65. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 163 (D. Gray ed., 1971) (quoting Humpty
Dumpty speaking to Alice: "When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less").
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1. Discharge v. Discharge 66
In current parlance, it only has one meaning, i.e., a permanent in-
junction against the attempt to collect a debt as a personal liability. In
the history of "bankruptcy" laws in the United States, though, 67 the
word had two very different meanings. The first meaning, and by far
the more prevalent well into the 1800s, was a release from being held
in prison on a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, i.e., an order that one
be held until a debt was satisfied. 68 These discharges were either
granted under laws providing a sort of amnesty from time to time, or
on the swearing of a "pauper's oath" by the person being held, as to
his inability to satisfy the debt at that time. Because this imprison-
ment was based on a particular court's writ to aid in collecting a par-
ticular debt, the release only applied to that court's writs. Thus, one
might still be imprisoned by a different court for different debts, and
there was no permanent exoneration from any of the debts. Moreo-
ver, after the Constitution was ratified, one might be subject to writs
issued by the state courts for debts brought under state law, and to
writs issued by the federal courts for debts found owing by those
courts. In a reversal of the normal rules in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
69
and its progeny, the federal courts and federal law quickly decided
that debtors held on a writ from a federal court would be granted the
same rights of release as a debtor held on a writ from a state court.
70
66. Moreover, the word may even be used more generically as a synonym for "release" as in
liens being "discharged" when assets are sold free and clear and the liens are transferred to the
proceeds. See Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 228 (1931). While not absolutely
guaranteeing that payments will be received in full (if the liens exceed the value of the property),
the sale and transfer process does not leave the creditor any worse off than it was before. The
Supreme Court referred to Van Huffel's use of the term "discharge" in Hood, though, to support
its holding that debts could be "discharged" and creditors barred from making further efforts to
collect on them from future assets that the debtor might acquire - a process that does make
distinct changes in the creditor's rights. Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1912.
67. "Bankruptcy," itself was an evolving term. In English and American law, well into the
1800s, "bankruptcy" laws, with a discharge of debts were thought to apply only to involuntary
proceedings against merchants; everyone else was subject only to "insolvency" laws in which a
"discharge" from prison was the only relief offered. See Sturges, 17 U.S. at 194-95; Hanover
National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 185-88 (1902). While the Court concluded in Hanover
that the "subject of bankruptcies," was broad enough to allow the range of proceedings we now
use, it is far from clear that States would have anticipated that development, the use of the term
in its modern sense, or the application of such proceedings to their debt at the time the Constitu-
tion was ratified. See Cordry, Seminole Seven, supra note 12, at 399-405, 439-440; see also infra
text accompanying notes 72-76.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
69. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that in a diversity case, state substantive law applies); cf.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-69 (1965) (holding that in a diversity case, federal procedural
provisions apply so as to provide federal uniformity).
70. Cordry, Seminole Seven, supra note 12, at 405-06. This may have been due to the absence
of federal prisons (see U.S. v. Knight, 39 U.S. 301, 304 (1840)) so that federal prisoners were
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Federal law did not attempt to dictate generally how and when states
would hold debtors on state writs and, to the contrary, allowed federal
writs to be controlled by state law rules on that issue.
Another important factor was that this "discharge," even though
phrased in very broad terms, was understood not to apply to debts of
the Crown, prior to the Revolution, nor, it appears, to the debts of the
State or the United States, thereafter. This was based on the principle
that general laws did not affect the government and could not take
away its rights, unless it was specifically mentioned therein.71 Thus,
even very general discharge language would not mean that a debtor
could be released if he were being held due to debts owed to the fed-
eral government. To the contrary, there were separate statutes specifi-
cally providing for how debtors could be discharged from prison for
such debts. In United States v. Hewes,72 the court discusses the fact
that even federal courts were not given the power to release debtors
owing money to the federal government. Instead, a separate tribunal
process was created to allow government officials to exercise discre-
tion in determining whether to release a debtor.73
These insolvency "discharges" from imprisonment were to be con-
trasted with a discharge of debt that could be obtained under a bank-
ruptcy law. Even under such laws, though, the same principle applied
throughout the 1800s. It was generally accepted that the same "clear
statement" rule meant that none of the first three Bankruptcy Acts
allowed discharge of governmental debts. 74 In any event, as noted
above, such discharges were initially extremely limited. While the
lodged in state jails and might be thought entitled in fairness to be discharged therefrom under
the same conditions, particularly when federal cases were all based on diversity jurisdiction and
suits likely brought by an out-of-state creditor.
71. See U.S. v. Herron, 87 U.S. 251 (1869) (extending historical discussion of practices under
English law and first three American Bankruptcy Acts); Dollar Sav. Bank v. U.S., 86 U.S. 227,
239 (1873) ("most general words that can be devised.., affect [the government] not in the least,
if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of [its] rights and interests"); Knight, 39 U.S. at 315-
16; U.S. v. Hewes, 26 F. Cas. 297, 298-300 (E.D. Penn. 1840). The modern "clear statement" rule
used by the Court in cases such as Atascadero is plainly a direct lineal descendent of this princi-
ple. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-43.
72. Hewes, 26 F. Cas. at 301.
73. See also U.S. v. Wilson, 21 U.S. 253, 254 (1823) ((holding a person could not assert state
insolvency laws to obtain discharge from prison for federal debt); People v. Rossiter, 4 Cow. 143(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (finding, by the same reasoning, insolvency discharge under state law did
not apply to debt owed to the state).
74. Herron, 87 U.S. at 261-63; U.S. v. Rob Roy, 27 F.Cas. 873 (C.C.D. La. 1870). An explicit
provision to that effect was contained in the 1800 Act, but the Court in Herron did not find that
such language was necessary to bar application of the discharge to federal debts. The same
principles were generally assumed to apply to state debts as well. See Connecticut v. Shelton, 47
Conn. 400 (Conn. 1879); Johnson v. Auditor, 78 Ky. 282 (Ky. 1879); Commonwealth v. Hutchin-
son, 10 Pa. 466 (Pa. 1849).
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laws gradually began to broaden debtor eligibility, it not until the 1898
Act that the principle of allowing non-business persons to voluntarily
seek permanent relief from the debt, as opposed to merely temporary
release from prison, was firmly accepted. Since, by this time, the con-
cept of imprisonment as a general tool of debt collection had largely
been dropped, the new usage of the term "discharge" tended to crowd
out the old. But, when reading pre-1898 cases, it is important to re-
member that the discharge being talked about is often only a dis-
charge from prison, not the discharge from the debt. And, in reading
those pre-1898 laws, the unwritten limits on using those laws for gov-
ernment debts must also be recalled. It was only when the 1898 law
took care to except and give priority to only certain government debts
that the Court concluded that this meant that the law now intended to
make sovereigns subject thereto. 75
2. "Jurisdiction"
The other great area of confusion is with respect to the term "juris-
diction" and all of its many variations. In Kontrick v. Ryan,76 the
Court noted that "Jurisdiction... is a word of many, too many, mean-
ings."'77 The same confusion about "jurisdiction," that arose in that
case is I submit, rampant in cases discussing bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion and the effect of the different type of jurisdiction on state sover-
eign immunity. As noted above, courts often describe bankruptcy
jurisdiction as being in rem, or as involving the adjudication of inter-
ests in a res, and stop, as if those two statements are synonymous, or
answer the question. In reality, though, one must review at least three
major issues: a) what are the various sorts of in rem, quasi in rem, and
in personam jurisdiction that may be used to decide "interests" in a res
and what limitations are imposed by each form of jurisdiction; b) what
are the types of "res" that may be adjudicated in such proceedings,
and c) how does the effect of the Eleventh Amendment vary based on
the type of jurisdiction and type of res that are involved. As will
emerge, answers to those questions have evolved over time - and re-
cent Supreme Court decisions may have made old answers obsolete
The discussion below will suggest that there is no general in rem
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity so that, if the Court in
Hood would try to find a basis for upholding the general discharge, it
might have to find that bankruptcy is "different," in a constitutional
sense, from any other form of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction in a
75. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912).
76. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
77. Id. at 454 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)).
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"law or equity" context, or else must rethink much of the last thirty or
forty years of litigation about in rem jurisdiction. 78 If the former, then
the Court would have been better served by taking up the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion to see if it could provide an escape mechanism. If the
latter, then all parties that would be affected thereby - including the
United States - would want to know and participate in such a dra-
matic change and explore its ramifications. The Delphic opinion that
emerged in Hood, however, does not serve any party well in trying to
predict the future.
B. In rem, Quasi In Rem, and In Personam
In any event, taking Kontrick's words to heart, it seemed useful to
return to the basics of civil procedure first, in light of the loose way in
which jurisdictional terms are often used in these discussions. My own
recollection was that the three types of jurisdiction broke down as fol-
lows. On the in rem side, true in rem jurisdiction applied when one
was divvying up rights (whether of ownership or not) that related to a
given asset and dealt only with that asset, while quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion used the court's control over an asset within its jurisdiction to
force an absent defendant to litigate on the plaintiff's home turf, over
issues that need not relate to the asset at all. Until the Supreme Court
began to endorse the use of "long arm" statutes to extend the reach of
personal jurisdiction, quasi in rem jurisdiction was critically important
to provide a basis for local suits against absent defendants. 79
Both types of in rem actions, though, as I understood it, would only
allow determination of rights relating to and/or limited by the value of
the assets. No affirmative recoveries could be made under either ju-
risdictional basis and the defendant could lose nothing beyond the as-
set that was being dealt with if he didn't show up. Conversely, if that
78. As will be seen below, the Court in Hood did analogize the bankruptcy discharge to an
admiralty proceeding to determine ownership of a sunken vessel. As will be further discussed
below, though, the rules in admiralty diverge considerably from in cases in "law and equity"(those referred to in the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover, the rules for in rem status decisions
differ from the rules for in rem title determinations, so on both counts, the comparison is
inappposite.
79. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding court could not personally serve
person outside its territorial boundaries; absent such service, no basis for in personam action to
proceed; case allowed only if debtor had property within state that could be attached), with Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945) (holding if company had "minimum con-
tacts" with state to satisfy due process, and service made on corporate agent within state, action
could proceed, domicile of defendant no longer dispositive). Because the property at issue
might often be the source of the harm, quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment of the asset
could easily overlap with an in personam suit brought under a long arm statute authorizing suit
for harm arising out of the asset and its use within the State.
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asset did not satisfy the alleged debt, the plaintiff could continue to
look for other assets and bring a new action against them. Similarly, if
there were competing claims against a single pool of money, the party
that lost out on priority grounds would not be barred from continuing
the same search for new assets to collect from. A corollary was that
parties need not join the contest over a particular asset in order to
retain the right to collect a debt, but could simply look for other assets
upon which to execute. On the other hand, if one wanted to have a
final resolution of all matters pending between the parties, and to ob-
tain an order that would allow execution against all existing and future
assets of the losing party, one had to rely on in personam jurisdiction,
and obtain personal service over a party. The resulting judgment
could be monetary, injunctive or both - and it certainly could "adjudi-
cate interests" in a particular asset if that were the relevant dispute.
C. The Historical Development of Jurisdiction
1. The Pre-1900s Law
To the extent that the courts tried to distinguish these different
forms of jurisdiction, they did so based on concerns about the territo-
rial limits of a court's powers. Those limits, in turn, derived from the
very real necessity of determining how a government could enforce
the judgments of a court. As Justice Holmes said "the foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power."80 The court may call on the executive
to control property within its territorial bounds, and the physical pres-
ence of persons within those bounds provided the initial basis for ju-
risdiction over them. Indeed, physical presence was necessary for
issuance of the two basic writs that were used in litigation - the writ of
capias ad respondum, and the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum.81 The
first is a writ by which the person of an alleged debtor was seized and
brought to court to respond to a claim by the plaintiff creditor. If the
debtor could not immediately satisfy the debt, or show that it was not
owed, or post a bond, he could be imprisoned under the second writ in
the "jail yard" until he had satisfied the debt.82
80. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
81. See generally Cordry, Seminole Seven, supra note 12, at 396-99.
82. It should be noted that, in practice, the imprisonment was not always what one would
expect. While, to be sure, there were true debtors' prisons in which unfortunates were held in
ruinous conditions, it is also true that, particularly in the United States, where the labor of every
man was needed, the definition of the "jail yard" was often greatly enlarged. In one case, for
instance, the law had initially provided that the town limits were the "jail yard" during the day,
but the debtor must return to a cell at night. See, e.g., Knight, 39 U.S. 301. The latter provision
was later dropped, and the jail yard expanded to take in the entire county for 24 hours a day!
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Those writs were used primarily because the vast majority of collec-
tion techniques used in modern-day litigation did not exist. A sheriff
could not force his way into a house to seize assets held therein by a
debtor who refused to come out. Writs of execution did not apply to
stocks, negotiable instruments, accounts payable, or the like. Credi-
tors could only execute on the crops growing on a piece of land, but
not the land itself - and all such collection efforts were suspended
while the debtor was in jail. Moreover, a creditor had to elect be-
tween a seizure of assets or holding the debtor in prison, and seizure
could bar later imprisonment, no matter how little was obtained
through the seizure. Thus, unless the creditor was quite sure of the
location of the debtor's assets and that they were of a nature that
readily could be seized, taking the debtor's person and holding him
until he voluntarily tendered payment was the safest way to proceed.83
The result was that debt collection was generally treated as being in
the nature of a contempt proceeding, whereby it was not up to the
creditor to find the assets; rather it was up to the debtor to choose
whether to turn over assets that the creditor might not be able to seize
(or find), or to stay in jail. While the law has now changed to the
point that contempt for failure to pay a money judgment is no longer
allowed in private civil litigation, it does still exist, at least for govern-
mental entities in the form of the "writ of body attachment." In those
cases, the government is still allowed in a contempt setting to seize the
person and hold him until he carries out the acts he is obligated to do
under a judgment, even including the payment of money.
In any event, in the 1700s and before, jurisdictional issues were rela-
tively simple - people and the land tended to stay put, and jurisdiction
over either was based on their physical presence in the territory of the
court, so that they could be seized (literally or constructively) and
brought before the court. In dealing with property issues, the courts
used a fiction and a presumption to assist in dealing with the problem
of absentee owners. Because it was initially thought that a court could
not send a summons or service outside its territorial limits, 84 other
means had to be used to allow the court to adjudicate the ownership
and rights in that property in a form that would have binding effects
that others could rely on. The courts accordingly created the fiction in
dealing with property interests of treating suits as if they were brought
directly against the property itself, rather than against the disputing
Thus, in at least some locales, this provision was more in the nature of a bar on relocation than it
was a serious limit on the debtor's movements or ability to earn a living to repay his debt.
83. See generally Cordry, Seminole Seven, supra note 12, at 395-96.
84. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.
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owners or those asserting a right to be paid from the property. The
fiction allowed the court to declare that the action could be brought
"against the world," i.e., the determinations made therein could not
be made subject to attack by another party whether it participated in
or was personally served with notice of the proceeding. The due pro-
cess issues arising from that fiction were resolved by the presumption
that any owner would, even if absent, arrange for a caretaker so that
he would know if any actions were taken against his land or ship or
livestock and could steps to defend those interests.
2. Modern Jurisdictional Precepts
Over the last hundred years or so, however, these fictions, presump-
tions, and distinctions have become increasingly eroded. The Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments notes "The distinction between "in
rem" and "quasi in rem" jurisdiction, on the one hand, and "in per-
sonam" jurisdiction, on the other hand, is in many respects elusive. 8 5
The Restatement set out the traditional divisions thus: a "true" in rem
proceeding is one brought "against all the world," in which "the court
undertakes to determine all claims that anyone has to the thing in
question." In a quasi in rem proceeding, either "the court undertakes
to determine the claims of specifically identified persons to the thing
in question" or, in a process now known as "attachment or garnish-
ment" jurisdiction, "a thing owned by a specific person is seized as a
basis for exercising jurisdiction to decide a claim against the owner.
The claim does not concern interests in the thing; it concerns some
other transaction." Thus, the quasi in rem jurisdiction noted in my
civil procedure class was only one such form, while the other looks
exactly like in rem jurisdiction, except that it purports to have a more
modest effect as to who is bound thereby.
The distinction between the two, the Restatement continues, was
based on the notion that an in rem action could bind everyone,
whether notice was received or not (or even whether sent), while the
quasi in rem action required at least some attempt to serve affected
parties. There were four types of actions generally thought to fall
within true in rem jurisdiction, the Restatement notes, at comment b -
admiralty libels, forfeiture to the government, proceedings to settle an
estate, and accountings and discharge by an administrator. All of
these, the comment states are matters meant to resolve potential
claims so an asset can be transferred free and clear at its highest value.
Interestingly, though, the comments adds, the admiralty libel is based
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 2, topic 2, § 6, cmt. a (1982).
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on a completely different set of substantive laws and analyses than the
other three, and according to the Reporter's Note, "it seems most un-
fortunate to subsume admiralty libels in rem along with other types of
in rem proceedings under a single category," noting that admiralty li-
bels could not discharge mortgage liens and other interests that cannot
be terminated without notice. 86 However, the Court's growing con-
cern with due process notice issues in these types of cases has largely
eliminated any real difference between in rem and quasi in rem juris-
diction and comment b suggests that it is questionable whether this
distinction "is useful for any purpose," if, despite the type of proceed-
ing, the same degree of notice and service must be attempted.
The Supreme Court noted these issues in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.,87 where it stated that "American courts have some-
times classed certain actions as in rem because personal service of pro-
cess was not required, and at other times have held personal service of
process not required because the action was in rem."' 88 Moreover, the
Court noted that an action by a fiduciary to account for its actions and
obtain a discharge by the beneficiaries has features both of an action
in rem (whether quasi or not) and in personam. Regardless of how
the action was to be characterized, however, the Court held, it could
not take place without notice to beneficiaries (by mail to known
claimants and publication for unknown claimants) and an opportunity
to be heard. One could not enter an order binding the world, unless
one made every effort to advise all the known portions of the world of
the issues so that they could litigate the issue with the party seeking to
benefit from the order. Numerous other decisions followed with simi-
86. An admiralty "libel" is a procedure to name a boat as allegedly "liable" for damages in a
wide variety of circumstances. It is not the same thing as an admiralty proceeding to determine
ownership of a sunken vessel, and is distinguishable from the allocation of an estate in a non-
admiralty proceeding. In U.S. v. Shaw, in limiting the counter claims that could be brought
against the federal government in a probate case where it had filed a claim, the Court noted that
"Emphasis is placed upon the fact that these probate proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem as
were the libels in admiralty in The Thekla.... The Thekla turns upon a relationship characteris-
tic of claims of collision in admiralty but entirely absent in claims and cross-claims in settlement of
estates. The subject matter of a suit for damages in collision is not the vessel libelled but the
collision. Libels and cross-libels for collision are one litigation and give rise to one liability." 309
U.S. 495, 502-03 (1940) (emphasis added). (This is akin to the holding in Gardner that the rais-
ing of a defense does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment.) A "libel" can also be used to
seek payment of wages, or for injuries suffered by a crew man, or monies owed to a supplier with
the boat being the source of payment. Since ships are both highly mobile and a valuable asset, it
is not surprising that a separate body of law grew up to ensure that the asset could be held within
the court's jurisdiction to answer just claims arising from its business operations.
87. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
88. Id. at 312.
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lar holdings. 89 Thus, the distinction between in rem and quasi in rem
based on the efforts needed to notify the affected parties has largely
disappeared.
As a result, and as the Court noted in both Mullane,90 and Tilt v.
Kersey,91 the question of whether an action is truly in rem boils down
to whether the government intends to make it so; i.e., to bind all par-
ties regardless of their actual knowledge or participation. On the
other hand, if the government is willing to allow for the possibility that
it is determining the relative rights between parties A through C, but
that the winner may still be subject to a challenge from party D, then
the proceeding would be quasi in rem (or perhaps in personam, de-
pending on the form of service on the defendants).
Since, after Mullane, the Court had largely removed any distinction
between the service requirements for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion, and, in light of the general benefits of finality, it is clear that the
tendency would be to make as many matters as possible fall under
true in rem jurisdiction. Doing so, though, had to take into account
the original basis on which courts were allowed to issue such far
reaching decisions, namely the fiction that the action was really
"against" the property. As such, the thought was that one could de-
cide rights of the property without doing something "against" anyone
specific (although the proceeding was said to be "against the world").
The notice aspects of that fiction were changed in Mullane. In Shaffer
v. Heitner,92 the Court eliminated the other aspect of the fiction; i.e.,
that the action was not "against" those persons whose interests in the
asset were being determined.
Until then, a seizure of assets had been thought to be enough to
allow the creditor to litigate any cause of action against the debtor, so
long as the judgment was limited to the value of the assets that were
seized. There need be no other relationship between the defendant
and the jurisdiction and the assets need have no relationship to the
cause of action. In Shaffer, though, the Court held that, even in the
quasi in rem situation, a court must apply the "minimum contacts"
analysis in International Shoe93 to the relationship between the prop-
erty, the owner, and the forum.
89. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796-779 (1983) and cases
cited therein (dealing with a wide variety of actions involving land (such as condemnation, tax
sale, etc.) where the Court required actual service on known creditors and publication, not
merely some action directly against the property such as posting an eviction notice).
90. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312-13.
91. 207 U.S. 43, 55-56 (1907).
92. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
93. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945).
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In particular, the Court noted, "The overwhelming majority of com-
mentators have also rejected Pennoyer's premise that a proceeding
'against' property is not a proceeding against the owners of that prop-
erty.... [W]e have held that property cannot be subjected to a court's
judgment unless reasonable and appropriate efforts have been made
to give the property owners actual notice of the action .... This con-
clusion recognizes.., that an adverse judgment in rem directly affected
the property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property. '94
Thus, the court held, to exercise jurisdiction in rem, "the basis for ju-
risdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing.'- 95
While to be sure the existence of the property itself would provide
some forms of such contacts - and disputes over ownership, for in-
stance, would normally be proper in the locale of the property, suits
having no relationship to the property at all would require greater
proof of contacts that would make it appropriate to assert jurisdiction
over the person before it would be proper to go forward. The Court
concluded by saying that "The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction
over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner
of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern
justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-
court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant. '96 In
short, the fundamental underpinning for the notion that a suit involv-
ing interests in property is not "against" the claimants thereto has
disappeared.
At the same time that in rem actions were acquiring greater due
process trappings, the fairly rigid requirements for personal service
within the forum state to achieve in personam jurisdiction were being
eased. The greatly expanded long-arm statute provisions that were
upheld in International Shoe, made it much easier to bring an in per-
sonam action against one who engaged in activities that caused dam-
ages in the state. The net result of these two lines of cases is that in
cases involving property, the distinction between quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion and "long-arm" personal jurisdiction (both of which now require
minimum contacts) has virtually disappeared. The only difference
that still remains is the notion that the judgment in in rem actions will
still be limited to issues regarding the property itself or its value. Af-
firmative relief against the other side still requires in personam juris-
diction by way of personal service. In sum, with the blurring of the
94. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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lines between in rem (broadly speaking) and in personam actions, it is
far from easy to tell which is which. Contrary to the automatic equa-
tion of the "adjudication of interests in a res" with in rem actions, it is
clear that such interests can be adjudicated in any of the three forms
of jurisdiction.97 The distinction between in personam and in rem ac-
tions appears to be more quantitative than qualitative, and deter-
mined by statutory intent, not by anything intrinsically different in the
nature of the proceedings.
D. Types of Adjudications of "Interests" in Property
Next, one must examine whether there is more than one type of
"interest" in a res that may be adjudicated, and whether immunity
issues have different effects with respect to the different types of "in-
terests." In analyzing the latter issue, it will become apparent that it is
not that the immunity changes, but rather that, upon making a
nuanced analysis, different types of litigation will have different prac-
tical effects on the government's interest. If an action nominally in-
volves the government but has no adverse effect on its rights, then the
courts will normally not find that there is an Eleventh Amendment
bar. However, where the result, no matter how the proceeding is
characterized, will result in binding determinations that will require
the government to act or preclude it from acting, 98 the immunity bar
normally will be found to exist. Reviewing the cases and the Restate-
ment indicates that there are three basic types of adjudications - asset
allocation, title determinations, and status determinations. The first
two will be examined in turn below and the immunity implications
discussed, and then the concept of an in rem "status determination"
will be reviewed. While it has resemblances to the other two, deter-
mining rights in a "status," as opposed to property, has its own
nuances.
1. Paying Debts from a Single Asset
The first type of action is the prioritization of competing claims that
are asserted against a single asset. A party facing such claims could
simply passively let the particular asset go to the first one that seeks to
execute thereon. But if a party wished to ensure that the asset went to
the entity that had the highest right thereto and to receive some pro-
tections for its own interests, or if the different claimants are proceed-
97. See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 143-44 (1983) (holding while "quiet title" action
generally is in personam, comprehensive attempt to adjudicate title to all water rights in a river
had binding effects on all and was in rem).
98. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).
2005]
216 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ing simultaneously, there are ways to collectively adjudicate the rights
of those competing parties.
a. Interpleader
The asset's owner could initiate a federal interpleader action under
28 U.S.C. 1335 by depositing the asset into the court, naming the con-
testants thereto, and leaving it to the court to sort out the result.99 At
the end of that process, the losing contestants are barred from con-
testing the ownership right of the winner as to that asset or from as-
serting rights against the party initiating the interpleader with respect
to any rights derived from that asset. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Tashire,100 the Court noted that, in some cases, the entitlement to the
fund itself, is the only issue.10 1 In such cases, where the rights to the
fund are the "outer limits of the controversy," the court may enter an
order under 28 U.S.C. 2361 barring any party from further litigation
with respect to the fund (the "classic" form of interpleader).
On the other hand, the Court noted, a fund may be simply one asset
that multiple parties may seek to collect from in the context of a larger
dispute between them and the defendant. In Tashire, for instance, the
fund was $20,000 in insurance on a bus driver who had been involved
in an accident that killed 2 people and injured 36. The amount of that
policy was vastly less than what was needed to deal with all of the
claims, yet the insurance company (later joined by the bus company)
sought to force all of the litigation over liability in the accident into a
single forum in the guise of litigating rights to that single policy. The
Court held this was improper, for much the same reasons that later
impelled the decision in Shaffer. An interpleader action could limit
claimants from any effort to sue the insurer for payments except under
the interpleader action, but could not impose any further limits on the
broader litigation. 10 2 It could not, in any event, bar further actions
against the primary tortfeasor as to other assets.
So, are interpleader actions in personam or in rem? In Metropolitan
Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Shan Trac, Inc.,103 the court stated that
they were in personam and could not bind those who have not been
given notice and directed to make their claim.' 0 4 But that begs the
99. Like the bankruptcy process, the federal statute allows for nationwide service of process,
although it does require diversity between at least two claimants as a jurisdictional limit. The
interpleader plaintiff is also entitled to place its own claim into the balance, as well.
100. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
101. Id. at 534.
102. Id. at 535.
103. 324 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2003).
104. Id. at 25.
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question, since even in rem and quasi in rem proceedings now require
notice, especially since the fiction that the action is "against" the asset
has been dropped. Other courts describe interpleader as an in rem or
quasi in rem action.10 5 Or, in yet another formulation, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copeland'0 6 that "Inter-
pleader is based upon in personam jurisdiction which extends only to
the funds deposited in court," (which actually sound a good deal like
quasi in rem jurisdiction). 10 7 In short, this form of adjudication of in-
terests in a res plainly is not necessarily an in rem action, although it
clearly can be one, depending on the relief sought and the parties
named. 108
b. Admiralty Libels (including the "Limitation" Proceeding)
Interestingly, while the Court made clear in Tashire that an inter-
pleader action was not in the nature of a "bill of peace" allowing a
defendant to force all parties and all litigation into a single proceed-
ing, there is an admiralty proceeding that has that effect, namely, a
"limitation" proceeding. This is a unique form of suit in admiralty
that allows a determination that, as to the owner of a vessel (who pre-
sumably will not be aboard when it causes the damage) the damages
in a given accident will be "limited" to the value of the vessel, if the
owner can show that the damages were not due to his negligence. If
granted, the various plaintiffs must divide their claims against that lim-
ited fund. If not granted, on the other hand, the parties may recover
damages both in personam against the owner and in rem against the
boat. 10 9 No such proceeding exists outside of admiralty. Bankruptcy,
for instance, does not entail an initial judicial decision on the available
assets based on the culpability or lack thereof of the debtor; rather, it
simply places all of the debtor's (statutorily non-exempt) assets in the
hands of the trustee for its creditors and proceeds from there. In any
case, the "limitations" defense is part of a larger action involving the
"libel" of a vessel and the determination of global liability for an acci-
105. See Gen. Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 553 F.3d 53, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1977).
106. 398 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1968).
107. Id. at 368 (citing Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966)).
108. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevey, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (holding absent personal
service, interpleader action could not purport to decide all of defendant's rights, as opposed to
merely issue of whether asset could be seized to pay debt allegedly owed by defendant); Gaines
v. Sunray Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1136, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding court can allow party to refuse
to submit claim in interpleader where amount being placed in issue had nothing to do with the
claim, and was much less than claim asserted; cannot be used "as a weapon to defeat recovery
from funds other than the one before the court").
109. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. of Hartford v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 217-18
(1927).
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dent, which, as the Court noted in Shaw, was not analogous to pro-
ceedings in law and equity to divide an estate. 110
c. Allocation of an Insolvent Estate (Non-ownership Interests)
In Tashire, the Court noted that interpleader did not provide a sce-
nario for dealing with mass torts or other situations where a party
might wish to force all of the claims against it into a single forum to
the greatest extent possible for allocation of a limited fund. That func-
tion has largely been left to the Bankruptcy Code.11' Under the Code,
a party turns over all of its non-exempt assets for claimants to divide
amongst themselves. That division in and of itself does not determine
any rights of a filing (or non-filing claimant) in assets that are not part
of the estate. To this extent, the bankruptcy process is substantially
identical to an interpleader action. Thus, to the extent that there is a
bar on further lawsuits, it comes from some other basis than the mere
division of those assets or the assertion of claims. As a corollary, state
proceedings that are in the nature of receiverships, assignments for
the benefit of creditors, and the like may proceed despite the exis-
tence of a federal bankruptcy law, so long as they do not force credi-
tors to accept discharge of their debts in return for some payment of
their claims.112 This, of course, follows from the Impairment of Con-
tracts Clause as discussed previously, but also makes clear that there
are numerous forms of proceedings that can result in a distribution of
assets among interested claimants.
2. Determination of Ownership Interests
The proceedings above dealt with a distribution of assets in which
the State merely asserted a right to be paid therefrom. A different set
of principles apply when the question is the sale of property in which
the State asserts a title interest, or an attempt to determine the valid-
ity of that assertion of title.113 In such cases, as Shaffer made clear, it
is impossible to adjudicate rights in the asset without determining the
110. Shaw, 309 U.S. at 502-03.
111. There is at least, potentially, the notion of a "defendant class action" where a plaintiff
might seek to force all of the suits against it into a single forum, and perhaps to limit the assets to
be used for such claims. There are formidable obstacles to such a proceeding outside of bank-
ruptcy. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 732-33 (2nd Cir. (1993).
112. In re Newport Offshore Ltd., 219 B.R. 341, 353-54 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1998).
113. Lien interests are somewhere between the two but, in normal practice, undisputed liens
are paid first from the proceeds of a transaction. If the lien creditor receives full payment in the
sale, its rights have not been adversely affected. The only potential problems are in the rela-
tively few cases where the sale cannot satisfy the lien, and the holder might have preferred the
property in lieu of the payment. But, since such sales would provide nothing for the property
holder, in most cases, the parties will likely reach accord on whether to sell the property or
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rights of the persons asserting such claims. It is one thing to say that a
debtor may pay debts from its bank account without affecting the
State's interest; it is another entirely to say that it could sell an asset in
which the State claims to hold title without having such an adverse
impact. These issues can arise in a variety of proceedings, such as a
quiet title action, an action in "ejectment," or a determination of how
to allocate water rights in a given river basin. The proceeding might
be brought directly against one or more other parties, in a typical in
personam action. On the other hand, a party may seek to obtain an in
rem determination that binds the world, by explicitly so stating in its
pleadings. Title issues certainly present a strong argument for a pro-
cess that is truly dispositive so that property transfers can go forward
without dispute. The decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,n 4 for
instance, noted the untoward consequences on state law property
rights if bankruptcy avoidance actions were overly intrusive and re-
sulted in overturning settled expectations of property rights.'1 5
In addition to state law actions, federal law also includes a provision
for clearing title. In any action where in personam jurisdiction could
be asserted, a party may use 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to bring an in rem action
to clear title to property from competing liens or claims. If personal
service is made, the action will then bind parties to the disposition of
the asset, but if not (but publication notice is given), the party has a
year to come in and have the judgment set aside." 6
E. Eleventh Amendment Implications of Asset Adjudications
1. Interpleader
As noted above, interpleader may be brought against a limited
number of claimants, but it can certainly be envisioned as a process to
name all applicants against a particular asset. Can a State be forced
into such an action in a federal trial court? It would appear not.
Where an action is brought in personam, the answer is easy, but even
where all relevant parties are named and an attempt is made to bind
the world, the Court has not allowed the action to proceed if the
State's interests are to be resolved.
For instance, the Court had to deal with the probate of the estate of
Howard Hughes after his death. Both Texas and California asserted
that he was domiciled in their jurisdiction so that they were entitled to
merely abandon it to the lien holder, in which case, again, there has been no action "against" the
lien holder.
114. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
115. Id.
116. GP Credit Co. v. Orlando Residence, Ltd., 349 F.3d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 2003).
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impose estate taxes. Neither state could be forced to sue in the
other's court, and there was certainly the possibility that both states
would, on the facts presented in their court, find in their own favor.
The result - with a marginal rate of 77% for federal estate taxes and a
combined 34% for the two states - was a tax rate of 101%, making it
possible that the claims of all three sovereigns could not be fully satis-
fied (much less leaving anything for heirs)! The federal taxes would
have to be paid in any event, but the executor wanted to avoid paying
death taxes to both states. A direct suit against the States would have
been barred, he concluded, so he filed an interpleader action against
the two state officials. In Cory v. White,117 the Court concluded that
the action was, in reality one against the States and, as such, was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 118
Moreover, the action could not be asserted against the state offi-
cials, pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine, since they had done
nothing illegal by pursuing their litigation of the domicile issue. And,
the Court concluded, nothing in its decision in Edelman v. Jordan119
eliminated the touchstone requirement that the state officer must be
alleged to have violated federal law before he could be named.120 The
net result was that there was no forum in the lower federal courts in
which the issue could be heard and the Court concluded that it was,
instead, a matter that would fall within the Court's original jurisdic-
tion to hear the case between the two states directly.121
117. 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
118. Id.
119. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
120. This follows from the fact that the Young doctrine does not simply allow the arbitrary
substitution of a State officer for the State. Rather, it is based on the notion that if one commits
an act that is harmful to the interests of another, one can escape personal liability only by show-
ing that a lawful directive of the government authorizes the act. If the directive is unlawful
(because in violation of the Constitution or federal law), it cannot protect the officer and he is
liable for his own personal acts. That is, if I hold a person and refuse to let them leave, this is
false imprisonment, unless I am a sheriff acting under a lawful state statute. If the law is invalid,
though, I am liable on the false imprisonment charge. Thus, there must always be a violation of
federal law by the state official before the doctrine applies. See Karen Cordry, Of State Sover-
eign Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex parte Young
Relief: A Response, 77 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 23 (2003).
121. California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982). See also Ky. for Benefit of United Pac. Ins. Co.
v. Laurel County, 805 F.2d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding interpleader statute does not over-
ride federal immunity); In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing interpleader action meant to resolve all issues in a res, but, where foreign governmental
entities had rights in the res, they were necessary and indispensable parties and could not be
forced into the proceeding); Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166,
1169 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding bank may not use interpleader against objecting Indian tribe).
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2. Title Interests
a. "Law and Equity" Cases
Unlike the mere payment of claims from an asset pool, an action
that purports to sell an asset in which the State claims a property in-
terest or that seeks to adjudicate the actual title to a piece of property,
is plainly subject to the Eleventh Amendment. The debtor seeks to
actually determine, and perhaps eliminate, a right of the state by a
transfer, with no certainty that the States' interests will be fully recog-
nized and protected. The law seems to be clear, both in and out of
bankruptcy, that an action to directly affect a State's ownership inter-
est is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. All nine justices in Idaho
v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,22 for instance, agreed that a true
quiet title action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
123
There are a number of cases that hold that one can distinguish be-
tween a title action and an action brought against a state court official
alleging that he was wrongly in possession of the property (because
the state's claim was invalid and provided no justification for his pres-
ence). 124 Even so, the decisions made clear that the finding with re-
spect to the official could not, in fact, bind the State or determine its
title to the particular property. And, since Couer d'Alene, the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that the distinction no longer can be main-
tained. It dismissed an ejectment action brought by an Indian tribe
against a State official, finding that the suit was, in essence, one
against the State and, as such, was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 125
122. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
123. Id. at 281-82 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.) (" It is common ground between the
parties, at this stage of the litigation, that the Tribe could not maintain a quiet title suit against
Idaho in federal court, absent the State's consent."); id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined
by Scalia, J., & Thomas, J.); id. at 307 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., Ginsberg, J., &
Breyer, J.). The only dispute was over whether the Tribe's effort to bar the State from continu-
ing involvement and regulatory control over submerged lands was the "functional equivalent" of
a quiet title action. See also Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment
bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to state property interests); Florida
Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982); U.S. v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237
(1960) ("well established that the United States was an indispensable party to any suit affecting
property in which it had an interest, and that such a suit was therefore a suit against the United
States which could not be maintained without its consent"); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591
(1904) ("state's title.., is the only one assailed. The state, therefore, is a necessary party. .. and,
as this suit cannot be maintained against a state, the bill, so far as it seeks to have tax sales
declared void, must be dismissed"); Christian v. At. & N.C. R. Co., 133 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1890)
(distinguishing between an action to force the sale of stock owned by the state, versus the sale of
property on which state held lien).
124. See Treasure Salvors. 458 U.S. at 685-89; Couer d'Alene, 521 U.S at 290-91.
125. Ysleta Del Sun Pueblo v. Leary, 199 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Further proof that governmental immunity applies to in rem actions
regarding title and other property interests can be derived from sev-
eral provisions where the federal government explicitly waived its im-
munity, so as to allow various proceedings to proceed when it is a
party thereto. In the context of water rights for instance, the federal
government has agreed to waive its immunity where there will be a
global in rem adjudication of the rights in a particular basis, but not
where there are only piecemeal decisions.126 In these global proceed-
ings, the state is the party adjudicating the rights, and presumably has
no immunity concerns with respect to participating in its own proceed-
ings. If there is more than one state involved with respect to a single
river, the actions will typically end up in the Supreme Court as origi-
nal actions between the States.
Similarly, there are provisions waiving the United States' immunity
with respect to issues respecting tax liens127 and liens in general. 128
Thus, it is clear that in rem title actions are generally subject to immu-
nity considerations unless they are waived in the case of the United
States, or could be lawfully abrogated in the case of States. The issue
of whether the property is in the "possession" of the government,
which arises in admiralty cases, does not appear to be discussed in law
and equity cases.
Section 363(h) allows the sale of property held by both the debtor
and another party under certain limited circumstances. There is little,
if any, case law dealing with whether this could be used to sell an
interest of the State over the State's objection. It is worth noting that
such a sale (unlike a sale free and clear of a mere lien interest which
may be brought by contested motion under Rule 6004(c)) must be
brought by an adversary action, underscoring the nature of this as a
dispute between specific parties. 129 Moreover, this is true even though
questions as to whether certain property belongs to the debtor go to
the core powers of the court and the scope of its jurisdiction.
126. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 803, 819 (1976) (finding
McCarran Water Rights Suit Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666, waives immunity of United States in compre-
hensive adjudications); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 569-70
(1983).
127. Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 243-44 (holding 26 U.S.C. § 7424 was enacted in order to deal with
immunity issues arising from such liens).
128. Id. at 244-45 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2410 allows private party to name United States in suit
to foreclose mortgage or lien or to quiet title). See also Hussain v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co.,
311 F.3d 623, 629 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding § 2410 waives federal immunity on lien issues, but does
not apply to attempts to quiet title where government is asserting ownership interest, and not
merely lien or mortgage).
129. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(3).
[Vol. 3:187
HOOD: How NOT TO DECIDE A CASE
b. Admiralty Determinations
The most that one can say about the Court's views on the Eleventh
Amendment in admiralty is that it is in a state of evolution. Courts
might have held that admiralty was not referred to in the Eleventh
Amendment (despite its preeminent position in the law of the day
when the Amendment was enacted) and concluded that it was a field
apart, never intended to be covered thereby. Some cases in the early
part of the Nineteenth Century arguably took that view - but also
arguably did not.130 However, following Hans, the Court decided two
companion cases in the 1920s and made broad statements to the effect
that admiralty cases were as much subject to the Eleventh Amend-
ment as were cases in law and equity.' 3 ' Both cases involved libels of
a ship, not ownership determinations.
Since then, however, in Treasure Salvors, and, even more clearly in
Deep Sea Research, the Court's conclusions on admiralty cases have
become a good deal more ambivalent. Treasure Salvors was deeply
split, and had no majority opinion. The case turned in large part on
the fact that the issue had merely been whether the federal court
could order assets to be physically turned over to it, compounded by
the fact that the State did not even have a "colorable claim" of owner-
ship by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. In the course of
the decision, while reiterating that the Eleventh Amendment barred
determination of title disputes involving the State, the plurality never-
theless added that "we need not decide the extent to which a federal
district court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction over property
before the court may adjudicate the rights of claimants to that prop-
erty as against sovereigns that did not appear and voluntarily assert
any claim that they had to the res."'
1 32
In Deep Sea Research, the Court addressed the ownership issue,
concluding that the Eleventh Amendment would not apply to owner-
ship issues if the vessel was not in the State's actual possession, be-
cause it had so held with respect to the United States in cases going
back as far as 1869. In addition to that unanimous holding, though,
four judges added concurrences that muddled matters considerably.
Justice Stevens suggested that some old cases that had not been been
130. See generally Welch, 483 U.S. 468.
131. In re New York (I), 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (treating actions as in personam against the State
when claimant sought payment for damages allegedly caused by ship leased to State); In re New
York (II), 256 U.S. 503 (1921) (holding property used by governmental entity for governmental
purposes is never available for seizure by private claimants who seek payment for death caused
by alleged negligence of ship owned by State).
132. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 697.
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cited in Treasure Salvors convinced him that it was likely that admi-
ralty in rem ownership actions were never meant to be covered by the
Eleventh Amendment. Justices Kennedy, Ginsberg, and Breyer sug-
gested that some of the holdings in prior cases were open for reconsid-
eration, noting that they might not draw a distinction between
whether assets were in the possession of the State or not in the admi-
ralty context. It is less than clear, though, which way they meant to go
if they no longer drew the distinction. They joined the opinion, so
presumably they agreed that non-possessory admiralty ownership dis-
putes involving States may be decided by federal courts but, if they
meant to imply that they would hold that a federal court could may
decide ownership rights in a vessel while in the actual possession and
control of the State, that would be a marked departure from the very
precedents they relied upon in granting relief against the State here.
And, by continuing to leave the New York cases intact, they left in
place the holdings that in personam and quasi in rem actions (i.e. non-
ownership issues) may not be brought in admiralty. In short, it is very
unclear where their "reconsideration" might come out.
In light of the Court's agreement in Deep Sea Research that the
Eleventh Amendment does apply to similar title issues outside of ad-
miralty, it is not clear why they thought admiralty was different, other
than the historical fact that it had been treated differently for other
governmental entities. Conversely, the Court made extremely clear
that it was not deciding any issue outside of admiralty. To the con-
trary, every single time that it described the proceeding it referred to
it as an admiralty in rem proceeding, not merely an in rem proceeding
in general. Thus, except perhaps from the extremely cryptic concur-
rences noted above, there is no suggestion that the opinion was meant
to apply outside of admiralty or was expressing a new view of in rem
actions generally. The net result seems to be that the Court might be
thinking of asserting a broad exemption of admiralty from the Elev-
enth Amendment, at least where the cases don't look too much like
typical in personam actions. This could be because admiralty wasn't
listed in the text of the Eleventh Amendment or because the historical
evidence might be read to support the view that litigation of govern-
ment ownership interests (absent actual possession of the vessel) had
been accepted at the time of the Constitution. Thus, this would fall
within the Hans analysis. Or, of course, it was possible that the Court
was coming up with a whole new treatment of in rem issues, generally,
despite the very carefully hedged language that it used throughout the
opinion.
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In trying to decide which possibility is correct, it is worthy of note
that, despite the admiralty cases dealing with in rem adjudication of
federal interests dating back to 1869, the Court had flatly rejected the
notion that it had created a general in rem exception in bankruptcy or
elsewhere, at least as to issues involving monetary liability and the
United States. In U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc., 133 the Court stated:
Equally unpersuasive is respondent's related argument that a bank-
ruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction overrides sovereign immunity.
[First, there was no actual res, where the debtor was seeking fungi-
ble dollars from the U.S. Treasury, not asserting rights in some spe-
cific fund of assets.] In any event, we have never applied an in rem
exception to the sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recov-
ery, and have suggested that no such exception exists, see United
States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, (1940). Nor does United States v. Whit-
ing Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983), establish such an exception, or
otherwise permit the relief requested here. That case upheld a
Bankruptcy Court order that the IRS turn over tangible property of
the debtor it had seized before the debtor filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection. A suit for payment of funds from the Treasury is quite dif-
ferent from a suit for the return of tangible property in which the
debtor retained ownership. The Court's opinion in Whiting Pools
contains no discussion of § 106(c), and nothing.., suggests that...
monetary recovery from the United States would be proper.
134
If there was any equation between admiralty in rem jurisdiction and
other in rem actions in law and equity, so as to make immunity inap-
plicable in both, then the United States would have had no such rights
since 1869 - which plainly is not case in light of Nordic Village. To the
contrary, that opinion certainly suggested that the nature of a pro-
ceeding as being in rem was irrelevant for immunity determinations
outside of admiralty. That position was further supported by the
Court's unequivocal statement in Missouri v. Fiske135 that:
The fact that a suit in a federal court is in rem, or quasi in rem,
furnishes no ground for the issue of process against a nonconsenting
state. If the state chooses to come into the court as plaintiff, or to
intervene, seeking the enforcement of liens or claims, the state may
be permitted to do so, and in that event its rights will receive the
same consideration as those of other parties in interest. But, when
the state does not come in and withholds its consent, the court has
no authority to issue process against the state to compel it to subject
133. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
134. Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added). Whether the United States agreed that sovereign immu-
nity did not bar a turnover order, or had missed the potential issue, or had concluded that sec-
tion 106(c) did waive the United State's immunity from injunctive relief, cannot be determined
from Whiting Pools, but the government's position in Nordic Village suggests that the last answer
is correct. That waiver, though, could not bind the States.
135. 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
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itself to the court's judgment, whatever the nature of the suit.1 36
(Emphasis added).
A series of cases that suggest a way to deal with non-admiralty title
issues were those by Circuit Courts before Deep Sea Research. They
assumed that the Eleventh Amendment applied to the sunken ship
cases but solved the effect of the Eleventh Amendment by holding
that they could decide the rights of all of the other parties inter se, but
would not decide any issues vis-a-vis the State. After the winning pri-
vate claimant was known, the State could either choose to negotiate
with that person, or it could bring its own affirmative action in state
court to assert its claimed rights in the vessel. 137 While such cases are
no longer valid in the admiralty context, they might provide useful
insights outside of admiralty.
3. Allocation of Bankruptcy Assets
In most bankruptcy cases, the State is not contesting ownership of
the debtor's assets; at most, it is merely asserting a right to be paid
therefrom. Does that process implicate the Eleventh Amendment?
Plainly, the answer is no. In and of itself, an allocation among various
claimants has only the most tenuous relationship to any determination
of interests adverse to those of the State.138 As stated in Gardner, it is
highly unlikely that the initial trigger for the application of the Elev-
enth Amendment exists. When parties are invited to come forward
and request to be paid, nothing is being done "against" them; no ad-
verse determination is made as to their interests if they choose to ab-
stain from seeking funds from that asset. Outside of bankruptcy, a
debtor is not thought to have taken action "against" the State if it pays
some debts, while owing money to the State, even if it doesn't first
give notice to the State and invite it to contest those payments.139
136. Id. at 28.
137. See Zych v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the Lady El-
gin, 960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992) and cases cited therein.
138. Clearly if the State files a claim, the court might not rule against it on the merits, but that
is inherent in any attempt by a State to affirmatively enforce a right. The Eleventh Amendment
is a jurisdictional limitation, not a guarantee that the State will never lose a case.
139. A creditor might be able to sue a recipient that aided a fraudulent transfer, but in most
situations where a debtor pays one creditor, that would be the exception. A party who merely
has an unsecured claim against a defendant has no right to demand that particular assets be set
aside for that claim or to object if another party is paid first. See generally Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999). Even with a judgment, one
merely has potential rights to collect from any given asset. Until those rights are exercised, the
defendant is free to use his assets. Thus, as the Court asserted in Gardner, it is difficult to state a
case in which one can claim that the bankruptcy payment process is one that is against the state.
Absent such adversity, the initial condition for assertion of immunity never occurs.
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The other reason why nothing is being done "to" the creditor is
because in a traditional in rem action, as discussed above, the parties
whose claims are not satisfied, are left with the ability to look for
other assets. The proceeding might bind the world in the sense that
one could not overturn an allocation of assets of which one had notice
and did not contest, but non-participants would not have any determi-
nations made as to their rights, and claimants who were only partially
paid could seek to collect from other sources. Under the same analy-
sis, a mere in rem allocation of the bankruptcy estate would impose no
inherent limits on the State's right to continue efforts to collect its
debt. One need go no further to see that there is no reason to find a
violation of the Eleventh Amendment in the allocation process as
such.
By the same token, even a sale under section 363 of an asset with
respect to which the state merely asserts a lien interest does not
implicate the Eleventh Amendment if the debtor relies on section
363(f)(3) to justify the sale. 140 While, to be sure, a lien is a property
interest of sorts, it functions primarily as a way to ensure payment of
a claim. If the debtor takes steps that results in the conversion of a
lien on an asset of uncertain value into a right to be paid in full from a
stack of negotiable currency, the State would surely have no reason to
say that something was being done "against" its interests. 141 Indeed,
transactions of this nature take place every day outside of bankruptcy,
as properties are sold, and amounts deducted for tax payments, with-
out anyone ever concluding that this would trigger the Eleventh
Amendment. The Supreme Court, in fact, drew exactly this distinc-
tion in Christian in distinguishing between an action to force the sale
of stock owned by the state, versus the sale of a property on which the
state merely held a lien. 142 While the former was barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment, the latter, in a foreclosure proceeding, for instance,
140. This assumes the better reading of that section, namely, that the section requires that the
sale must provide enough to satisfy the face value of all of the liens. See In re WDH Howell, 298
B.R. 527 (D. N.J. 2003) and In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, Ltd., 159 B.R. 821 (N.D. Il. 1993)
and cases cited therein. The section would merely express a tautology if it were interpreted to
apply to the value of the liens as computed under section 506(a) (since the value of the liens is
limited by the value of the property, the property could always be sold for the value of the liens
under that analysis). Of course, a sale under section 362(f)(1) or (2) would also not implicate
sovereign immunity - if the State agrees to the sale, or its nonbankruptcy law allows for the sale
to take place, regardless of the price received, there would be no reason why the same process in
bankruptcy would trigger any immunity issues.
141. The primary function of section 363, after all, is to authorize the debtor to take actions
that it could unquestionably have done if it were not in bankruptcy, but that it is precluded from
carrying out once the petition is filed. Selling things outside of the ordinary course of business is
primarily a matter between the debtor and the bankruptcy court, not the debtor and the State.
142. Christian, 133 U.S. at 243-44.
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would not be precluded. The analysis is no different here. The discus-
sion in Gardner about the court's right to deal with liens, appears to
arise in the context of determining the allocation of assets in the es-
tate. Since the State asserted a secured status for its claim, review of
that assertion was simply part of the overall review of the claim that
needed to be made.
F. Determination of Status
So, if the claims allocation process does not impinge on the State's
rights, despite (and, indeed, because of) its in rem nature, where is the
basis for the Code's "discharge," i.e., the injunction barring creditors
from asserting personal liability against a debtor for debts dealt with
in the bankruptcy proceeding? Can that discharge arise from the in
rem nature of the claim allocation process? Plainly not, because no
matter how much effort is put into allocating a specific res, the pro-
ceeding, by its very nature ends, when the assets are allocated. Some-
thing else must be relied upon to justify the discharge. It could, of
course, be sought on an in personam basis against known creditors but
the concern is that it would leave loose ends and would, as to the
States in any event, plainly be subject to the Eleventh Amendment.
So is there some other form of in rem proceeding that does not adjudi-
cate property interests, some other form of res? The answer is yes,
although it is a point that has rarely been even alluded to by name,
much less clearly analyzed in the bankruptcy context.
This is the notion that one can have an "in rem" determination of a
right to an intangible "status." The Restatement of Judgments de-
scribes such status actions as involving the relationship between a per-
son and society, such as citizenship, or between particular persons,
such as marriage or the parent-child relationship. 143 In the ordinary
course, while the grant of the status may entitle a person to certain
benefits and rights vis-a-vis other persons, the status determination is
usually sought for reasons apart from merely gaining the right to those
benefits. Marriage is not just about the right to file joint tax returns,
for instance. Moreover, the parties that provide the benefits are not
necessarily the ones conferring the status, and have normally no obli-
gation to continue the benefits even if the status does not change.
While marriage under state law allows for those federal tax benefits,
the federal government is not obligated to continue providing them
and could change its tax structure at will, despite the adverse impact
on parties with a certain status.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, topic 3, § 31, cmt. a (1982).
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In most cases, too, there are only a limited number of parties that
may participate in the determination or challenge it. Since a status
determination in most circumstances has no effect on the interests of
other parties, there is no reason why they should be brought into the
process or given legal rights with respect thereto. According to the
Restatement, though, if there are parties whose rights will be directly
affected, and they are not given the ability to challenge the determina-
tion, they will not be bound if they are prejudiced thereby. Indeed,
the discussion notes, despite the characterization of the process as be-
ing in rem (and, hence, theoretically dispositive against the world) the
degree of claims preclusion varies widely, depending on the conflict-
ing interests of different parties that may be affected thereby. 144
More to the point, it is not at all clear that status determinations are
exempt from the Eleventh Amendment. To be sure, it is possible for
one governmental entity to determine a status issue without running
afoul of the immunity interests of another entity, even if the status
determination may affect the actions of the other entity. In Gao v.
Jenifer,145 the court dealt with a situation where state law determined
whether a minor alien was a "dependent" person. That status in turn
entitled a minor to be treated as a "special immigrant juvenile" under
federal immigration law, with consequent benefits for him. The Sixth
Circuit rejected the federal government's argument that the state ac-
tion violated its sovereign immunity. The right to determine depen-
dent status was one normally exercised by states and the federal law
made no effort to preempt that right, even for a juvenile construc-
tively in INS custody. Nothing the state did barred the federal gov-
ernment from acting, in a constitutional sense, on immigration
matters. The federal law chose what effect to give to those having the
status of "dependent" minor under state law, and the federal govern-
ment could change that effect if it were dissatisfied. Thus, the court
held, while the status determination had an incidental effect on fed-
eral interests, it did not violate the United States' immunity - not be-
cause status determinations were not subject to the Eleventh
Amendment but because, in this case, the determination, in and of
itself, did not adversely affect the United States' interests.
144. For instance, marriage normally has no legal impact on others, nor will an annulment.
But, where a divorce decree provides for alimony until a party remarries, the former husband
may have the right to question whether the annulment removes the "marriage" that ended his
alimony obligations. The annulment then might bind the rest of the world, but not him. The
Restatement adds in the Reporter's Note, comment (f) that "The older authorities are in hope-
less conflict as to whether non-parties are concluded by a status determination." Id.
145. 185 F.3d 548 (6th Cir.1999).
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The Restatement makes no mention of a bankruptcy "status," but
there are some old cases that use the term in bankruptcy. Shawham v.
Wherritt146 dealt with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, which, in some
cases, required proof the debtor had committed an "act of bank-
ruptcy" to warrant commencing the case. The Court held that, where
the public had been notified that the debtor allegedly made fraudulent
transfers, the adjudication of the debtor as a "bankrupt" was an in rem
determination that bound all interested parties. The effect of this de-
termination, though, was merely to set the case in motion and did not,
as such, limit or destroy creditors' property rights. Its only effect was
to require creditors to respect the bankruptcy case and not proceed
with separate activities to collect from assets under the control of the
court. Similar litigation was required to commence certain cases
under the 1867 Act, and, again, the Court having determined that no-
tice had been given, and that the debtor satisfied requirements to be a
"bankrupt," held that the determination of the debtor's "status" was
binding on all creditors.1 47 A corporation was also adjudicated a
"bankrupt" in an in rem proceeding under the 1867 Act, but that judg-
ment did not affect the creditors' property rights because corporations
did not receive any discharge. 148 Note, too, that none of these cases
involved State creditors (and, recall, that State debts would not be
discharged in these proceedings in any event). Thus, none of the deci-
sions had occasion to rule on the issue of whether a "status" determi-
nation could bind an unconsenting state.
In each of these cases, the effect was, essentially, the same as now
occurs when the filing of a petition automatically triggers a bank-
ruptcy filing and a stay of other proceedings. Under those prior Bank-
ruptcy Acts, though, the petition did not necessarily have that effect
and a preliminary litigation had to take place to set the bankruptcy
process in motion. However, while the result of the determination
that the filing party could assert the "status" of bankrupt, would bind
the world if proper notice were given, the facts underlying the decision
on the bankrupt status would not be res judicata as to anyone who did
not participate directly in that status hearing. In Gratiot County State
Bank v. Johnson,14 9 for instance, the Court noted that an involuntary
bankruptcy could be commenced upon evidence pointing to allegedly
fraudulent transfers.150 The alleged recipients of the transfers, though,
146. 48 U.S. 627, 643 (1849).
147. See Michaels v. Post, 88 U.S. 328, 428 (1874).
148. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 665 (1875).
149. 249 U.S. 246 (1919).
150. Id. at 249-50.
[Vol. 3:187
HOOD: How NOT TO DECIDE A CASE
were not bound by that determination and were free to prove that the
transfers had not been fraudulent. Thus, this "status" decision was
more a matter of practical convenience to be sure that all parties knew
when the case had started and the court had asserted its exclusive ju-
risdiction that it was any attempt to resolve the creditors' rights. And,
it is also likely that, just as the automatic stay "binds" the world and
voids actions in violation thereof but can be annulled to protect the
innocent, a party that innocently ran afoul of that status decision
could have asked the court to modify its order to protect his interests.
These cases, in any event, only dealt with the commencement of the
case. In Hanover, though, the Court was called on to decide the con-
stitutionality of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.151 Most of the decision
dealt with other issues, but the final contention of the creditor was
that the Act deprived him of due process by virtue of both the lack of
notice of the commencement of the case, and the adjudication of the
discharge. The Court noted that this Act, unlike prior ones, allowed
the case to begin merely by the debtor showing that he had debts, had
filed his schedules, and had agreed to turn over his assets. Since com-
mencement of the case involved no disputed facts, the lack of prior
notice of the filing was not material, since the creditor was given no-
tice of its rights to contest the discharge. The Court held that credi-
tors were bound to the allocation of the estate by virtue of being given
notice of the initial filing of the bankruptcy petition and, thereafter,
Congress had the right to decree that a discharge would be entered
unless objections were filed thereto. The decision on such objections,
the Court then held was a determination in rem that the debtor held
the status of "discharged bankrupt," which could be granted even if
personal service was made on each creditor (although notice was
needed). This description of the discharge as an in rem determination
of a status was reiterated in passing in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.152
Neither case involved a state creditor or discussed whether the status
could override Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Other than those two cases, the notion of an in rem status as the
basis for upholding the discharge has almost never been alluded to as
such since then. It does undoubtedly underlie decisions that uphold
the discharge but the courts almost never distinguish between the in
rem allocation of the estate (which is irrelevant) and the in rem deter-
mination of the "status" of the debtor not just as a "bankrupt," but as
151. Hanover, 186 U.S. at 192.
152. 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934).
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a "discharged bankrupt," which has a considerably different effect on
the rights of the creditors.
G. Is an In Rem Status Determination Subject to the
Eleventh Amendment?
The next obvious question is whether a status determination, in
general, or in the bankruptcy context, in particular, can truly bind all
parties, particularly those protected by the Eleventh Amendment. To
begin with, the notion of a status determination fits somewhat poorly
with the rights granted by a bankruptcy discharge. Other status deci-
sions, as noted above, are typically directed at personal relationships
or relationships directly with the state (such as citizenship). It is pre-
sumably precisely because of their general lack of impact on others,
and the special importance of certainty to the petitioners, that the pro-
ceedings are treated as binding the world at large - unless those other
persons have a special interest.
If one compares the bankruptcy status determination with the kind
of determination dealt with by the Sixth Circuit in Gao, there are no-
table differences. While the determination that Gao was "dependent"
had independent consequences from the INS proceeding and federal
immunity, obtaining the status of "discharged bankrupt" has no pur-
pose other than to eliminate the property rights of other parties. Nor
is this a determination of a matter primarily of concern to the govern-
mental entity granting the status (such as citizenship or dependency)
and that has an effect on others only to the extent they choose to take
that status into account. (States might only choose to hire United
States citizens, but no one would argue that their independent deci-
sion to do so would mean that a federal judgment on an applicant's
citizenship somehow impacted on their immunity, since they are free
to change their criteria). But, bankruptcy status is designed precisely
to determine the fights of other parties and its entry automatically
imposes obligations on them that they may not change or eliminate.
In short, the granting of this "status" looks a very great deal as if it
were the result of a typical law suit between opposing parties seeking
fights guaranteed by a federal statute. If the Code merely provided
that a debtor could allocate its assets and then request an injunction
naming specific creditors in an in personam action to bar any further
collection activities, this would surely look like an action subject to the
Eleventh Amendment. Is there something specific about delineating
this process as a a "status" issue that truly differentiates the situation?
Could one have a "status" of "non-exempt" worker under the Fair
Labor Standards Act? Would that status determination include an
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analysis of one's job duties, pay grades, and other factors relative to
whether one is entitled to overtime? If so designated, could the fed-
eral government allow the process of determining that "status" to be
determined in federal court at the instigation of the state employee?
If not, what is it about the bankruptcy "status" in particular, or in rem
decisions generally, that would make them exempt from the Eleventh
Amendment?
To recapitulate: in rem jurisdiction arises when the government
chooses to create a proceeding in which it wants all interests to be
decided at the same time. The proceeding will still not be binding on
the world unless there has been adequate notice to all known, affected
parties and publication notice to others. These due process duties are
required because, as stated in Shaffer, in rem actions are, still, in real-
ity adjudications of the interests of the parties that own the property
interests being determined. There is no such thing as a disinterested
determination of property rights apart from and in isolation from the
rights of the parties asserting those rights. While the extent of the
rights being determined may be somewhat more limited than if the
plaintiff can obtain personal service over the defendant, the litigation
is no less a decision on personal rights. 153 The failure to provide direct
notice to known parties means that, even in bankruptcy, the discharge
is not effective as to them.154
To be sure, the degree of concern for the interests of other parties is
tied to the scope of the interests being resolved in the in rem action.
Where only rights in a particular asset are being dealt with, this obvi-
ously has a lesser impact than if the litigation purports to decide all of
the rights between the parties. Similarly, proceedings that merely al-
low a claim for payment to be asserted against a given asset are less
problematic for immunity purposes than proceedings that determine
ownership. The first, as discussed above, reasonably can be analyzed
as not affecting the government's interests at all, and hence, not some-
thing that would trigger immunity concerns. The latter plainly does
affect the government's interests - and, as such, is treated as being
153. In essence, one might conclude that this is a corollary of the rejection of Justice Douglas'
eloquent plea in Sierra Club v. Morton that trees should be given standing to protest their own
despoliation. 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972).
154. See, e.g., In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc., 863 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1989); Reliable Elec.
Co. v. Olson Const. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622-23 (10th Cir. 1984). Cf City of New York v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953) (holding that absent mail notice to city as
known creditor, court could not enter reorganization order that terminated city's liens); U.S. v.
Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding absence of notice
precluded treatment of priority claim as tardy). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2005),
which is plainly grounded in the same concerns.
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subject to the government's immunity. If one weighs the discharge
"status" determination on that scale, it clearly seems more like the
"title" determination than the asset allocation determination. Just as
a decision on ownership unavoidably impinges on the government's
rights, so too does the grant of discharge with its concomitant injunc-
tion against any collection actions against any non-estate assets now
or in the future. Indeed, it provides nothing to the debtor apart from
that limitation on the rights of others. Thus, by any standard form of
analysis used outside of bankruptcy, there is a strong argument that
even the general discharge is subject to the Eleventh Amendment,
much less a specific discharge complaint. Put another way, if the fed-
eral government can simply choose to design a litigation process that
can be invoked by private litigants to decide the rights of unconsent-
ing states, how is this any different from any other form of
abrogation?
If there were particular kinds of actions that had always been han-
dled throughout history by in rem actions (and no other), and histori-
cal practice showed that such actions were filed against the Crown and
the colonial governments, one might plausibly argue that such actions
were within the contemplation and agreement of the States in ratify-
ing the Constitution as part of the "plan of the convention."'155 But, if
as seems clear, virtually any kind of proceeding can be deemed by the
government to be in rem, how does that suggest that there was any
kind of clearly agreed to process that the States had agreed to be
bound by? It is clear, to the contrary, as shown above, that many
types of in rem actions may not be brought against the State. Moreo-
ver, if the federal government cannot authorize a private party to sue
the State as the sole defendant, why can it do so by adding "the
world" as additional defendants? To be sure, if one is trying to bind
the world, one can argue persuasively that it would be useful to be
able to bind the States as well - but how does that necessity argument
comport with the unequivocal words of the Eleventh Amendment?
Where does the Amendment state that is applies to all cases in "law
and equity," except those where the federal government thinks it's re-
ally important that a decision should bind the States?
It certainly seems clear, in any event, that, as a historical matter,
bankruptcy and insolvency laws at the time of the Convention and for
111 years thereafter were not areas in which governmental rights and
obligations were treated as akin to those of private entities, and cer-
tainly not ones where another government could necessarily dictate
155. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.313, 322-23 (1934).
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those rights. The federal government did not dictate state insolvency
laws; rather, it allowed states to decide those issues as to federal judg-
ments except for those owed to the United States. And, until the 1898
Act, government debts were not dischargeable and generally received
priority so what adverse effect could the proceeding have had on the
government? Bankruptcy was simply a creditors' remedy to be as-
serted against a very limited number of debtors. The States in 1787
could not have imagined the degree to which it would have burgeoned
nor the notion that in all of the 1.6 million cases filed in 2004, private
parties could obtain orders barring states from collecting their debts.
To the contrary, this is exactly the type of proceeding, "anomalous and
unheard of" at the time of the Convention, that Hans said must be
viewed as being subject to the Eleventh Amendment.
If bankruptcy proceedings weren't contemplated, can one argue
that a "status" decision actually isn't "against" the State, because it is
only determining rights in the status res? But how can a federal court
have jurisdiction to decide anything if there is not first a "case or con-
troversy" between opposing parties? If an action is not "against"
somebody, and doesn't determine concrete rights, it has no business
being in federal court! The reality is that Shaffer made clear that such
arguments are fictions that cannot be used to eliminate the rights of
the parties being affected by those determinations. Property and sta-
tus, like trees, don't have standing and don't litigate about themselves
separately from the interests of the entities fighting over the benefits
and detriments of those decisions. The bottom line is that a discharge
decision granting an individual an injunction from a federal court to
bar a State from pursing a lawful debt looks disturbingly like any
other suit in law and equity subject to the Eleventh Amendment.
In this regard, it is clear that a discharge order (particularly in the
context of an order confirming a plan) is not some mere mechanical
implementation of a statutory right created by Congress and effective
without judicial intervention. While the automatic stay does fit that
mold, the discharge plainly does not. The courts have never hesitated
to find that a discharge order that is entered with adequate notice can
bind parties to language that does not conform to the Code. The An-
tonelli case is a primary example of this - the Fourth Circuit assumed,
for purpose of the decision, that the State was correct in its contention
that the confirmation order provided relief that exceeded that actually
allowed by section 1146(c). Yet, the court had no hesitation in holding
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the State was bound by the confirmation order because it had not ap-
peared to contest it.156
Of course, had the State appeared, the court also made plain that
the appearance would have been a waiver of its immunity. Thus, the
court conceded, there was no question that the State was placed on
the horns of a dilemma - appear and waive one's immunity (and be
bound by the decision) or fail to appear and be bound by the decision
by default. Yet, the court opined, that did not coerce the State to
appear, or turn the confirmation/discharge process into a suit against
the State. 157 Measured against the standards that the Supreme Court
enunciated in Federal Maritime, though, which held that such a Hob-
son's choice did unlawfully coerce the State to appear in federal court,
the entry of the general discharge would appear to be such a coercive
action even if no summons was issued to the State.158 Even more
clearly, therefore, it would appear that an adversary complaint to de-
termine the discharge status of a specific debt would so qualify as a
coercive proceeding that would trigger the Eleventh Amendment.
If one does not like that conclusion, this would seem to leave only
two possibilities. First, one can come up with an analysis that con-
cludes that bankruptcy in rem determinations are somehow different
than any other type of in rem decisions in law and equity on some (as
yet unspecified) basis, but leaves the Eleventh Amendment applicable
to bankruptcy decisions not based on in rem jurisdiction (whatever
those might be). Or, the Court could have opted for the escape route
chosen by the Sixth Circuit, namely to deny that the Amendment ap-
plies at all. The latter analysis at least had the virtue of providing a
simple and clear result - namely, that none of these constitutional is-
sues need be addressed because Congress can simply do whatever it
wants.
So, this would have been the analysis that the States could have
presented to the Court in Hood if it had asked for the topic to be
briefed. Since the Court did not do so, it was left to its own research
and we can now see how many of these issues the Court spotted on its
own, and how it used the broad variety of precedent it could have
cited. Moreover, how clearly did the Court understand the procedural
actions taking place in the case, including the distinctions between the
general discharge and a specific discharge complaint, and the results
that would occur in each case if the State chose not to appear? To
what extent did the Court understand why the drafters of the Code
156. Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 782.
157. Id. at 787.
158. Federal Maritime, 535 U.S. at 763-64.
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and the Rules required that some actions proceed by motion and
some by adversary proceeding? Did it provide adequate guidance for
the future for parties dealing with the vast range of proceedings in a
bankruptcy case that might involve the States? Those questions will
be taken up next, along with some attempts to predict where the
Court will go from here.
IV. HOOD - THE ARGUMENT AND THE DECISION
A. The Argument
As noted above, the first question in the argument was whether the
case was controlled by the holding in Deep Sea Research about admi-
ralty title in rem proceedings. Justice Ginsberg then linked that both
the process of allocating the debtor's estate as an in rem proceeding
and the debtor's in rem discharge status. Thus, in less than a minute
she had conflated all three different types of in rem proceeding, with
no clear indication that there was any difference between the three, or
that the consequences for sovereign immunity purposes varied greatly
between the different types, much less between actions in admiralty
versus in law and equity.
At other points in the argument, both the Court and counsel for the
debtor appeared to confuse the effect of the entry of the general dis-
charge with the litigation of the specifics of the particular debt owed
to Ms. Hood. The Court seemed to be less than aware that, while the
grounds for denying a discharge in general could affect all creditors,
resolution of the disputed facts of the debtor's post-discharge earning
capacity and life style would have no bearing on any other creditor.
Debtor's counsel contributed to the confusion by stating that the
bankruptcy court "would have a heightened responsibility to deter-
mine whether there was a basis for an undue hardship discharge be-
cause the decision is... affecting everyone," 159 although a decision on
the discharge of a particular debt has no effect on other creditors.
Because the Court seemed to view the student loan hardship issue
as being bound up in the determinations that would go into the gen-
eral discharge determination, the Justices repeatedly suggested that
perhaps Congress could have just discharged all student loans, so why
should the States complain if they were given the right to contest
some of them? That argument might have been well directed if the
issue had dealt with a section 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) exception where
Congress used that sort of process, but it clearly set up a different
requirement for student loans. Under the Code, the grant of the gen-
159. Trans. of U.S. at 34, Hood (No. 02-1606).
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eral discharge status is merely a first step in student loan cases; there-
after, the debtor is still obligated to initiate another litigation with the
State to determine his individual rights. To view that as part of a
global in rem determination, underscores that the term in rem has no
inherent meaning except that "the United States wants this proceed-
ing to bind the States as well as everyone else."
In any event, the Court seemed far more interested in speculating
about what Congress and the Rules drafters might have written,
rather than passing on what they had done. Amidst a whirl of ever-
more complex hypotheticals about other Codes and other Rules, the
State's counsel eventually conceded that the general discharge could
bind the States, a position he had not taken at the beginning of the
argument. Nevertheless, he valiantly tried to point out to the Court
that conceding the point for the argument was irrelevant, since in this
context, it would be no different than saying that substantive applica-
tion of a law to the State would not allow it to be applied to particular
facts in a judicial proceeding, but in vain.
The Court spent considerable time with both the State and debtor's
counsel trying to understand exactly what would happen in an "adver-
sary proceeding," particularly if the State just didn't show up. This
was clearly an area in which notice to the parties of the Court's inter-
ests would have been of assistance, since the Court was unsure of the
facts, and the answers were not overly clear. On Tennessee's side, this
was undoubtedly a result of the fact that the State Solicitor was not a
bankruptcy lawyer as such, and had less reason to be fully cognizant of
these fine points of bankruptcy procedure, when none of them were
part of what had been appealed. But, even the debtor's counsel's an-
swers were less than models of clarity or accuracy. The correct answer
to what happens if the State doesn't show up in an adversary or a
contested matter is that it will, almost certainly, be defaulted and it
would be highly unlikely that the court would ask for more from the
debtor than whatever was alleged in its complaint. Debtor's counsel,
on the other hand, first agreed there would be a default, but then
turned around and agreed with Justice Ginsberg that the bankruptcy
judge would have to "find" that there was undue hardship. He then
added that the court would not merely "find" the issue based on a
failure to appear, stating that "The difference is ...that all of the
property of a debtor and claims against that property - they're -
they're all under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. So a bankruptcy
[Vol. 3:187
HOOD: How NOT TO DECIDE A CASE
court has a special obligation to - to protect the interests of all credi-
tors and the estate. '
160
The result of all of this was that the Justices had little patience with
the distinctions that the Rules draw between motions and adversary
proceedings. The Court appeared to assume that decisions on which
procedures would be required were somewhat arbitrary and did not
see them as reflecting the very distinctions between proceedings af-
fecting the interests of creditors as a whole for which adversaries are
not generally used, and those affecting the interests of a specific credi-
tor (or the debtor, in the case of the attacks on its discharge) which are
protected by the use of adversary proceeding requirements.
It was not until virtually the end of debtor's counsel's time that any-
one on the Court sought to sort out the distinction between the estate
res and the right to a discharge status and that any reference was made
to Hanover. Debtor's counsel made clear that he was not arguing that
matters such as preference actions would be related to the in rem as-
pects of the case, whether based on arguments about the estate or a
debtor's "status." And, finally, during rebuttal, in response to ques-
tions from Justice Ginsberg, the State's counsel noted that the State's
position would not deprive the debtor of a forum to have its issues
heard - a point that did not appear to have fully registered with the
Court, in view of some of the language in its opinion.
B. The Decision
1. The Majority Decision
The Court's bottom line conclusion was that the "discharge of a stu-
dent loan does not implicate the State's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity," so that it need not reach the issue on which it had granted
certiorari of the Sixth Circuit's opinion.
The Court began by stating that States may "be bound by some
judicial actions without their consent," citing Deep Sea Research - an
in rem admiralty action. The Court then stated that the "discharge of
a debt by a bankruptcy court is similarly an in rem proceeding." For
that proposition, it cited Gardner, which was not a discharge case.
161
It also cited three other cases - Straton v. New,162 which held that
once a bankruptcy case was filed, the bankruptcy court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the property in the estate and a party could not en-
force a lien in state court while the case was pending (i.e., a matter
160. Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added).
161. Gardner, 329 U.S. 565.
162. 238 U.S. 318 (1931).
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now dealt with by the automatic stay); Hanover, which had the lan-
guage referring to the discharge as an in rem status determination; 163
and New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.,164 in
which a corporation was given the status of "bankrupt" at the onset of
the case, but did not involve the discharge of debts). Thus, of the four
cases, only one dealt with the discharge or linked the in rem status
issue to that issue, and only one (Gardner) involved a State entity, but
did not deal with a discharge issue. On the other hand, none involved
the sort of title determination that was at issue in Deep Sea Research,
so none of them were similar to Deep Sea Research on the critical
issue.
The Court then cited various recent lower court decisions holding
that the right to grant a discharge was based on a court's jurisdiction
over the debtor and his estate, not over creditors. It then stated that it
had previously held that States, whether or not they participated in
the case, were bound to the discharge. It cited Gardner for that pro-
position although Gardner has nothing to do with discharges and the
opinion does not even contain the word "discharge." It also cited New
York v. Irving Trust Co.,165 which only held that the State must abide
by court procedures to collect from the estate and also does not in-
clude the word "discharge" either. The third citation was to Van Huf-
fel v. Harkelrode,166 which held that bankruptcy courts may sell assets
free and clear of state liens.
The issue in Van Huffel, though, was the interpretation of the 1898
Act which did not specifically provide for that power. The Court
agreed that the power should be found to exist because it had been
included in prior Acts and was inherent in the general process of mar-
shaling the estate. Immunity was never raised as an issue, and the
Court did not rule thereon. Indeed, the only reason the case had
arisen was because the bankruptcy court had erroneously paid mort-
gages first without satisfying the tax lien as it should have done. Fol-
lowing the proper procedure, of course, would have resulted in no
harm to the state. Van Huffel cited a great many cases allowing such
sales, and many appear to explicitly rely on that payment right to jus-
tify allowing the sales to proceed.167 And, even if some mortgage liens
could not always be paid in full, first priority tax liens almost certainly
163. Hanover, 186 U.S. 181.
164. 91 U.S. 656 (1876).
165. 288 U.S. 329 (1933).
166. 284 U.S. 225 (1931).
167. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Grain Corp., 9 F.2d 802 (2nd Cir. 1926) (finding court may sell free
and clear if price allows liens to be satisfied from proceeds).
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would be paid. And, finally, as noted, above, "discharging" the lien by
transferring it to the proceeds received does not, in any realistic sense,
result in any loss of any right the State actually had. A lien cannot
guarantee satisfaction of the debt, it only represents a right to have
that asset devoted to payment of the debt according to state law pri-
orities - which is exactly what happens in the "free and clear" sale.
Thus, while this cases comes closest to supporting the court's point, it
still falls far short of proving that the Court had ever previously de-
cided the actual issue at stake now.
The Court then stated that "when the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion over the res is unquestioned ... our cases indicate that the exer-
cise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does not infringe state
sovereignty." It cited only Irving Trust and Van Huffel for that princi-
ple, although, as set forth above they do not deal with that proposition
at all. It then stated that Missouri v. Fiske,168 which explicitly held that
immunity did apply to in rem proceedings is "not to the contrary!" It
did not cite Fiske's actual lanaguage, but asserted that Fiske is actually
consistent with its view that the courts can use in rem proceedings to
discharge debts of States despite their lack of consent to any proceed-
ing in the bankruptcy court. It noted that the question of enforcing
the discharge injunction was not now before it and that Fiske had not
decided the enforceability of the underlying federal court determina-
tion against the state.
That raises a striking question - is the Court suggesting that even
though the discharge may be entered and bind the State, it cannot be
directly enforced against the State? That would seem to be a hollow
victory indeed for the debtor. Or, perhaps the Court is suggesting that
it may still only be susceptible to actual enforcement through an Ex
parte Young action against State officials? It is impossible to tell what
the Court means here.
On the other hand, by citing Fiske, the Court apparently meant to
suggest that the proceedings in that case were like those that result in
the bankruptcy discharge, that is where the determinations being con-
tested were being made in the same procedure in which the injunction
was sought. The actual facts in Fiske, though, are considerably more
complicated. They boil down to the fact that the judgment in question
had been entered years previously and the present issue was a sepa-
rate suit being brought to enjoin the State from holding probate hear-
ings in which the results of the prior decision might have res judicata
effects. The Court in Fiske noted that it was not deciding whether that
168. 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
2005]
242 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
prior in rem decision could bind the State substantively but that, in
any event, it could not be the basis for a new injunction that would
prohibit the State court from reviewing the issues itself. While it may
be fair to say that the holding in Fiske is not entirely dispositive of the
discharge issue, it is difficult at best to read the case as in any way
consistent with the views about in rem jurisdiction begin espoused in
Hood.
The Court then suggested that adhering to the plain import of
Fiske's language would require a finding that Irving Trust had been
overruled sub silentio. But that ignores the language in Fiske, which,
after stating that in rem jurisdiction could not justify jurisdiction over
a State's objection, added that "If the state chooses to come into the
court as plaintiff, or to intervene, seeking the enforcement of liens or
claims, the state may be permitted to do so, and in that event its rights
will receive the same consideration as those of other parties in inter-
est. ' 169 Since that is exactly what took place in Irving Trust, there is
no reason to think that the two opinions are contradictory or that the
Court in Fiske did not mean exactly what it said.
After noting that the State had conceded that the general discharge
could be entered against it, the Court then noted that student loans
used to be discharged but that in 1976, Congress provided a benefit to
States by making it more difficult to "discharge student loans guaran-
teed by States." (This suggests that the Court also believed the claim
of the Sixth Circuit that States were the primary beneficiary of this
change, as opposed to the federal government.) The Court then stated
that the major difference between student loans and other debts is
that State creditors that choose not to submit to the court's jurisdic-
tion may still receive some benefit. because of the affirmative obliga-
tion of the debtor to prove hardship. This, of course, assumes that
debtors will not be able to readily default State creditors on this issue
if they do not appear.
The Court then stated that "a debtor does not seek monetary dam-
ages or affirmative relief from a State by seeking to discharge a debt;
nor does he subject an unwilling State to a coercive judicial process.
He seeks only a discharge of his debts." That suggests that any action
that merely seeks to restrain the State from acting is qualitatively dif-
ferent from an order that requires the State to act of pay money -
although Dugan equates the two forms of relief. 170 And, while the
debtor does not want money from the state, it certainly affirmatively
169. Fiske, 290 F.2d at 28.
170. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620.
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wants the entry of an injunction against the State. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult so see how the Court can say that this is not a coercive judicial
process, since the State plainly is being haled into court under current
law.
The Court then stated it had endorsed "individualized determina-
tions" of States' interest, citing again to Van Huffel and the "dis-
charge" of the liens there, although, nothing in that opinion actually
deal with any "determination" of the State's interest, as opposed to a
mere failure by the trustee to properly observe payment priorities
(and a failure of the State to timely object to that failure). It then
cited Gardner yet again even though the only "determination" there
was on the merits of the claim that had been voluntarily filed by the
State. It then returned to Deep Sea Research and once again equated
bankruptcy and admiralty because they both dealt with in rem juris-
diction. It apparently failed to notice the difference in the type of in
rem proceeding in the two cases as well as the fact that in Deep Sea
Research it had explicitly noted the very distinctions between admi-
ralty and law and equity cases that it now dispensed with.
The Court then muddied the waters somewhat more with its foot-
note 5, where it denied that it was necessarily saying that "a bank-
ruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction overrides sovereign immunity."
Rather, it was only saying that the exercise of such jurisdiction to dis-
charge student loan debts "is not an affront to the sovereignty of the
State. Nor do we hold that every exercise of a bankruptcy court's in
rem jurisdiction will not offend the sovereignty of the State." The
Court resisted the temptation to indicate which actions would be an
affront to State sovereignty since those issues "were not before it."
Finally, the Court turned to consideration of the procedure used. It
noted that creditors are not necessarily entitled to personal service
before a bankruptcy court may discharge a debt, but in so stating, it
failed to distinguish between the general discharge for which that is
true, from the determination on specific debts where the Rules do re-
quire personal service. (This may be another instance where the
Court is discussing alternative procedures that the Rules drafters
might have used.) It then suggested that student loans were unusual
in requiring an adversary proceeding, although, any ruling on the dis-
chargeability of a specific debt requires just such a proceeding. The
Court then said the adversary proceeding had "some" similarities to a
traditional civil trial (in fact, it's essentially identical to such a trial)
but rejected the argument that the case was governed by Federal Mari-
time because "we have long held that the bankruptcy court's exercise
of in rem jurisdiction is not such an affront." In other words, the
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Court did not address the issue on the merits, it merely made a circu-
lar reference to its prior assertion that the issues had already long
since been resolved (despite the lack of any precedent that actually
supported that assertion). It then stated flatly that "Our precedent
has drawn a distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction,
even when the underlying proceedings are for the most part, identi-
cal," but cited nothing at all for that sweeping proposition.
The problem with the Court's "we've always done it this way" anal-
ysis is that, at best, it might show that since 1898 Congress had as-
serted that it could discharge state debt without affecting state
immunity. However, according to Hans, the analysis must be made
with respect to what States knew and agreed to in 1787, not 1898, and,
as shown above, and in the State's brief, there is no basis to find such
acquiescence at the earlier date. The Court took exactly this position
in Federal Maritime, where it noted that evidence that administrative
agency proceedings had not been brought against states until 1918,
and that there was no evidence of such actions at the time of the Con-
stitution.171 Moreover, it also overlooks the fact that many of the con-
ceptual underpinnings that supported such an assertion in 1898 (such
as that this wasn't really an action against the State) have been over-
ruled since then. In short, even if the Court had been able to find any
cases that actually supported its assertions on the discharge and the
States, they could be attacked from both the beginning and end of the
historical scale.
Finally, the Court set aside the fact that the State was, in fact, sum-
moned to appear by the complaint. That result, the Court held, was
merely a consequence of the Rules, so it could apparently be disre-
garded, since debtor's counsel had assured the Court that "the Bank-
ruptcy Court cannot discharge her debt without making an undue
hardship determination." And, since the Court had concluded that
the debtor was entitled to have her discharge litigated in federal court,
it could not let "elementary mechanics of captions and pleadings"' 72
or the decisions of the Rules drafters stand in the way. It did add
though that "The case before us is thus unlike an adversary proceed-
171. Federal Maritime, 535 U.S. at 755-56.
172. Couer d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270. The language is from Couer d'Alene, but there it was
used to support the holding that the State's immunity could not be ignored despite the fact that
the suit was filed nominally against the State officers, instead of being used to ignore the fact
that a federal complaint had been filed directly against the State as such. Here, it is turned on its
head to hold that an actual suit directly against the State does not trigger immunity because it's
really - what? Not an action against the State because it's an in rem determination? But what of
Shaffer's flat statement that all in rem actions are still actions against specific persons and
entities?
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ing by the bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover property in the hands
of the State on the grounds that the transfer was a voidable
preference."
The Court then held that it needn't decide whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a State would be valid under the Eleventh
Amendment (i.e., it wouldn't address the Sixth Circuit's rationale) be-
cause it had written the decision to avoid a constitutional question.
That assertion is curious, since the Court plainly was deciding a point
of constitutional law, just not the one that had been appealed. Noth-
ing in the opinion turned on interpreting the Code and its language -
to the contrary, the Court seemed ready to disregard entirely the
Code and the Rules if they impeded the ability of a bankruptcy court
to decide the discharge complaint. Thus, States are still left to con-
front this issue in future cases and the ambiguous wording of the deci-
sion is likely to encourage further efforts in that regard. The final
point in the opinion is yet another curious statement - "If the Bank-
ruptcy Court on remand exceeds its in rem jurisdiction, TSAC, of
course, would be free to challenge the court's authority." Unless one
thinks that the court might, in the midst of reviewing the debtor's fi-
nances suddenly decide to order the State to pay her a bonus, or some
other unlikely event, it is difficult to imagine what the Court might
have meant by that statement. Or could this be another cryptic refer-
ence to the notion that perhaps the bankruptcy court can't enforce the
discharge decision? Again, the Court doesn't explain.
2. The Dissent
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, noting initially that regardless
of what the analysis might be if Congress had established a discharge
by motion process, the fact was that it had used an adversary proceed-
ing. They noted that the "alternative argument" that the Court had
chosen to rely on was not presented to the court below or in the
debtor's brief to the Supreme Court and should not have been consid-
ered. They then noted that the adversary proceeding was essentially
identical to traditional federal court litigation, and that factor had
been enough to convince the Court in Federal Maritime to apply the
Eleventh Amendment even to a non-court procedure, much less to a
normal federal suit. While they accepted the notion that a proceeding
by motion might or might not offend state sovereignty, they insisted
that the Court had no business ignoring the process that had been
established. Moreover, they noted, the effect of a failure to appear,
just as in Federal Maritime, would be that the State would forfeit its
rights, which would plainly coerce it to appear. The dissent then went
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on to explain that, while they would consider the possibility that there
was a bankruptcy in rem jurisdiction exception, they viewed the ques-
tion as a difficult one and not one that was answered in any way by
Deep Sea Research. They also viewed the Court's decisions in Fiske
and Nordic Village as warranting considerably more attention and
weight than the Court had accorded them to that point, and noted that
Van Huffel and Irving Trust could not readily bear the weight that the
Court placed thereon, in that neither dealt with immunity issues.
They ended their opinion with an unequivocal rejection of the Sixth
Circuit's position, so there are, at least, two expressed votes for that
position (three if one counts Justice O'Connor's stated view in
Hoffman173).
C. The Aftermath
So what is one to make of the opinion? To begin with, its logic
basically boils down to two syllogisms. The first is: "There is an in rem
proceeding in admiralty; there is an in rem proceeding in bankruptcy;
therefore the two proceedings are the same." That analysis, though,
does not take into account that there are three different types of in
rem proceedings and that the admiralty proceeding in Deep Sea Re-
search dealt with ownership decisions, while bankruptcy normally
deals with asset allocation and status decisions. Since, as was shown
above, the nature, rationale, and treatment of the three types of ac-
tions differs widely both within admiralty or law and equity, much less
between them, the Court's facile equation of the two matters either is
wrong, or means that the Court is sub silentio wiping out numerous
decisions that make those distinctions.
The second syllogism is even simpler: "We have issued decisions
about this in the past and it hasn't been held unconstitutional, there-
fore, it can't be unconstitutional now." That is, to be sure, a function
of stare decisis, but before one rules on the basis of stare decisis, the
prior cases must be carefully reviewed to be sure that they really are
factually and legally analagous. As set out above, though, the cases
cited by the Court really don't match up with the propositions for
which they are asserted, much less create an impregnable barrier of
well-settled precedent. While some of the "words" match up, the anal-
ogy breaks down when they are looked at in context and examined as
to whether the actions being allowed to proceed are being imposed on
the State or have any adverse effect on its interests. Both of those
factors have to be present before the Eleventh Amendment will kick
173. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105.
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in to begin with. On the other hand, the Court's casting aside of the
most closely applicable decisions, Fiske and Nordic Village, while
barely acknowledging their holdings, suggests that the Court is skittish
about looking too closely at unhelpful precedent.
The Court's opinion really seems to be based in the end on its sense
we've been doing this for so long, how could there possibly be a ques-
tion about it? The problem is that, immunity litigation is not a good
candidate for saying "we've always done it that way" and moving on.
The whole field has been in ferment for the last forty years or so, with
determined attacks and reconsiderations of the scope of State immu-
nity from the courts and Congress. (This is in contrast to the extended
period from after the Civil War until well into the middle of the Twen-
tieth Century when immunity was well recognized, accepted, and ex-
tended beyond the literal words of the Eleventh Amendment.).
Moreover, immunity is a voluntary choice of the States to assert or
waive. In an era when bankruptcies were relatively few and far be-
tween and provided fewer benefits to debtors, it may not have seemed
a point worth pushing. At a time of 1.6 million bankruptcies, a highly
mobile population, strained state budgets, and ever-increasing federal
mandates, it is not surprising that States may seek for ways to reduce
the burden on them from demands by private debtors. If so, and if
this was not an area where it had waived its rights in 1787, it is not
clear that they can be made subject to a sort of laches argument for
not protesting sooner. Is there a way for the Court to get to where it
wants to be? Perhaps. But, as Justice Thomas suggested, and as ex-
tensively explored above, the States believe the fight should have
been (and perhaps in the future will be) far harder than it turned out
to be this time.
Before one goes to the bankruptcy specifics, it is worth noting that
the Court's extremely broad statements about in rem jurisdiction may
have ramifications far beyond this case. As noted above, there are
many forms of in rem actions outside of bankruptcy and there has
been little question that the Eleventh Amendment applies therein to a
greater or lesser degree. By suggesting, for instance, that the immu-
nity exception for the title-determining form of in rem action may not
be limited to admiralty, this opens up a veritable Pandora's box of
new litigation. There is very little in the Court's discussion of in rem
proceedings that is drawn from anything unique to bankruptcy - or to
the Eleventh Amendment, for that matter. Thus, not only could its
words be used against the States, but the United States may equally
find the words coming back to haunt it. It has waived its immunity
with respect to some, but by no means all, such proceedings and it
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would not be surprising to find plaintiffs using these words against the
United States in the future. But, enough of generalities, what are the
bankruptcy specifics?
V. HOOD- IMPLICATIONS
A. Discharges
Obviously the decision means that the State cannot contest the en-
try of the general discharge or hardship discharges for student loans.
But there are many uncertainties after that. Did the language distin-
guishing the "enforcement" of the discharge injunction from its entry,
or the reference to the bankruptcy court "overstepping" its bounds,
mean that the Court thought that the State could not be directly
named in a contempt proceeding if it did not abide by a decision on
the hardship issue? Currently, State officials are named in (the rela-
tively few) discharge contempt proceedings that are filed. Is that what
the Court intends to continue?
By the same token, did the Court assume that discharge complaints
for other exceptions would now be brought against the State as op-
posed to its officials? Since the general discharge already made those
debts discharged or not, how does the two-party dispute between the
State and the debtor with respect to a penalty debt, for instance, fit
into the model of an in rem status determination? The hardship issue
at least bore some resemblance to the overall discharge decision since
it dealt with the sort of issues of income and liabilities that underlie
the general discharge (although, of course, the decision did not actu-
ally affect any other creditors). But, can one really seek to litigate
over the status of "discharged bankrupt without penalty debts" or
"discharged bankrupt who doesn't owe taxes?" Doesn't that make
the notion that this is tied up with a status issue meaningless? Indeed,
an interesting exercise would be to ask what would be the result if
Congress passed a law that established a "student loan only" form of
discharge? Could it use the bankruptcy law to create an in rem status
of "bankrupt student loan debtor" which would be established by fil-
ing a petition, and instituting a suit against the government to prove
that the student loans were an undue hardship to pay? While one
might question whether this would fall under the "subject of bank-
ruptcies," would there be any immunity bar under the Court's analy-
sis? If not, how would this two-party only form of bankruptcy relate
to the notion that the filing is "against the world?"
In any event, in practical effect, it doesn't make much difference,
whether it is the State or its officer who is named, but cautious debtors
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might be advised to name both until the issues are sorted out. One
down-side of this for other creditors may be the likelihood that States
may file more claims. Until now, concerns about opening oneself up
to a discharge complaint under an application of section 106(b), has
militated against such filings. Now, there may be no reason to hold
back, which may impinge on other creditors' recoveries.
B. Automatic Stay
Despite much wringing of hands, this has never been a serious prob-
lem. Unlike the discharge injunction, which requires judicial interven-
tion and allows for a contested procedure, the stay is a statutory
provision that is triggered by the act of the debtor passing a piece of
paper to the court clerk. The stay was, in fact, changed from an in-
junction to a statute precisely to avoid issues as to whether immunity
barred application of the injunction. 174 Like every statutory provi-
sion, it may be enforced against state officials under Ex parte Young.
The primary effect of the existence of immunity is to allow the State to
argue that a section 105 injunction cannot be entered against the State
if the court determines that the State's actions do not violate the auto-
matic stay. If there is no violation of the law, then the court may not
create a new set of restrictions that it then enjoins state officials from
violating.
C. Avoidance Actions; Monetary Suits
The States certainly intend to continue to argue that Hoffman and
Nordic Village are still good law. Both cases plainly started with the
premise that the governmental entities would be immune from the
avoidance actions unless either waiver or abrogation were found ap-
plicable. Nothing in that premise has changed and the Court appears
to recognize that fact. Finding that a two-party action would be in rem
merely because it would bring more assets into the estate would ex-
pand the concept beyond all reasonable definitional limits. 175 Moreo-
ver, if that were the basis on which a matter could be deemed to be in
rem, then it would be equally applicable to actions to collect on con-
tract or tort claims against non-debtor parties. Such an expansion
would play havoc with the concepts underlying the decision in North-
174. Cf Murdock Mach., 81 F.3d at 932 (holding that sovereign immunity barred stays im-
posed under Bankruptcy Act Rules from binding United States).
175. Query, though, as to whether the argument would be different with respect to postpeti-
tion transfers where one could assert that the money came out of the actual estate.
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ern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 176 Moreover, it would run
directly contrary to the Congressional intent in section 106(a). That
section does not list section 541 as one of the sections as to which
abrogation was attempted, precisely so as not to allow debtors to be-
gin to sue states on "related to" matters solely by the expedient of
filing bankruptcy. 177
D. Section 505 Actions
The States still intend to assert that, in the absence of a filed claim,
section 505 can not be justified on an in rem analysis, for the same
reasons as with respect to avoidance actions, and that the attempted
abrogation in section 106(a) is invalid.
E. Section 363 Orders
As discussed above, to the extent that the sale does not impinge on
the States' rights, they will have no quarrel with the proceedings. If
their only interest is a lien, and it is satisfied from the sales proceeds,
they would also have no reason to object. The States will be analyzing
these issues very carefully and likely will not be in any hurry to "push
the envelope" on these issues until the effect of Hood is better under-
stood. The Court's decision explicitly dealt only with the discharge
question, but in light of its heavy reliance on Van Huffel and its broad
assertions as to what that case meant, this is not a high percentage
argument for the States at least unless and until they are able to open
up the dialogue to the broader principles and precedents discussed
above, On the other hand if there is an attempt to sell an asset in
which the State claims an actual property interest, this is likely to cre-
ate more of a problem for them, in light of the historically greater
protections provided to ownership interests. On the other hand, in
light of the rather stringent standards imposed by section 363(h) for
allowing such a sale to proceed, it seems likely that in most cases, the
State might be amenable to allowing the sale to proceed.
F. Lien Avoidance Actions
The Tenth Circuit BAP held in In re Mayes (Mayes v. Cherokee Na-
tion)178 that an avoidance action to remove a lien held by a tribe on
176. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Cf In re Lawson BuNch Association, Inc., 59 B.R. 681, 689 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. 1986) (holding turnover provisions of Section 542 could not be used to resolve con-
tract dispute and finding Eleventh Amendment barred contract suit).
177. See 140 CONG. REC. H 10764, 10766 (House Judiciary Committee, Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994-Section-By-Section Description, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Oct. 4, 1994).
178. 294 B.R. 145 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003).
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the ground that it impaired the debtor's exemption was barred by the
tribes's immunity. Such an action, of course, would have a considera-
bly different effect than a mere sale free and clear of the lien, with the
lien attaching to the proceeds. The BAP concluded that the action
was an attempt to dispossess the state of its property right represented
by the lien and rejected the argument that this was the sort of global
action which might qualify as an in rem proceeding not subject to sov-
ereign immunity. Rather, the court concluded this looked much more
like an action in personam between the debtor and the creditor to
which immunity still applied, and noted that the debtor's view would
have an asserted in rem exception swallow up the entire case. The
same arguments and analysis will undoubtedly be revived now - and
the same concern. If anything at all that affects property of the estate
is deemed thereby to be part of an in rem exception, then one might as
well deem bankruptcy to be exempt from the Eleventh Amendment
and move on. As a substantive matter, the avoidance may bind the
State in the same way that the automatic stay does; as a procedural
matter, that would suggest that an action might lie against a state offi-
cial who refused to remove the lien, or could perhaps be brought
under some state court quiet title action.
G. Procedure
There have been many recent cases dealing with the issues of "dis-
charge by declaration" and other problems arising from the presence
of plan language that arguably conflicts with Code proceedings. The
courts are split between the relative merits of res judicata and due
process. The opinion provides conflicting signals in this respect. To
the extent that it brushes aside the decision to impose adversary ac-
tion procedures and protections as largely meaningless, it suggests the
Court might side with the res judicata side. On the other hand, the
Court explicitly required that the bankruptcy court must actually de-
cide the hardship issue and, apparently, not merely take a default
judgment. This would certainly tend to support the due process side.
As to student loans, the States expect the courts to take the Supreme
Court at its word and deny any effect to hardship determinations that
occur without actual findings and conclusions by the judge. This
would presumably overturn Andersen, although it is less clear whether
the result would differ with respect to the interest discharge that the
debtor granted herself in Pardee.
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EPILOGUE
One last question must surely be what would have been the result if
the Court came out the other way and said the Eleventh Amendment
would bar discharge of debts of unconsenting States? First, of course,
this would not have been unprecedented; it would have returned the
law to its state from 1787 until 1898. Second, it probably would not
make a huge difference. While there is no good data on the subject, it
seems likely that taxes, student loans, and domestic support payments
are, by far, the largest categories of state debts, and all of those debts
already are excepted in whole, or in great part, already. When one
adds other exceptions such as fraud, willful and malicious injury pen-
alties, and the like, it does not leave a lot to be discharged. Third,
there is probably nothing that would stop Congress from adding pro-
visions whereby filing or being paid on a claim barred further collec-
tion on the debt (unless it were otherwise excepted).
Finally, if Congress actually was concerned about discharging stu-
dent loans (although all efforts for the last 25 years have been in the
direction of limiting the discharge, not expanding it) there are many
ways to address the problem. Two points should be kept in mind -
first, States are involved essentially as the agents of Department of
Education ("DOE") and, second, regulations already require that
guarantee agencies assess hardship issues before they move to collect
the debt. DOE could, for instance, amend their contracts with States
to require that they process the issues in bankruptcy court. (Recall,
the Tenth Circuit thought this was what DOE had done, but it was
mistaken.) Or, DOE could use rule-making to clarify the multitude of
issues about what is "undue hardship" so that it would be possible for
far more of these cases to be administratively resolved by the State
agency and DOE could monitor them to ensure proper performance,
without leaving any private right of action under the Code. (Indeed,
why require an entire bankruptcy filing if this is the primary issue?).
Or moreover, DOE could take the hardship assessment in-house, de-
cide the issues, and inform the States when they were relieved from
the need to continue trying to collect from those debtors in order to
retain their federal reinsurance benefits. A different approach would
be stricter limits on what would be lent to those going into occupa-
tions unlikely to generate enough income to repay the loans. As of
now, states have little leeway to deny loans to anyone not already in
default, even if the likelihood of repayment seems small. Any or all of
these options would probably do as well or better than the current
situation where the law is not remotely uniform on these questions.
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The bigger issue is more likely to be with respect to corporate con-
firmation issues and the discharge they receive. The options of tying a
discharge to claims filing probably exists wholly apart from any at-
tempt at abrogation. There are few corporations as to which the State
would not have some claim- and, if it had no claim, the lack of a
discharge would hardly threaten the corporation. The real effect is
more likely with respect to the attempts to use bankruptcy as a means
to avoid state regulation of restructuring, but it is far from clear that
bankruptcy affords such relief in any event.' 79 For now, this remains
merely interesting speculation - but exploration might calm some
fears about the "end of bankruptcy" if the Court ever takes a good
look at these issues.
179. Cf. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. California, 350 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting preemptive
effect of Section 1123(a)(5) only to matters covered by Section 1142(a)).
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